本文精选了管理学运营管理类国际顶刊《Manufacturing & Service Operations Management》近期发表的论文，提供运营管理研究领域最新的学术动态。

Operational Strategies for Distributing Durable Goods in theBase of the Pyramid

原刊和作者：

Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 2022年7月

Andre P. Calmon （Scheller College of Business）

Diana Jue-Rajasingh （University of Michigan）

Gonzalo Romero （University of Toronto）

Jackie Stenson （Technical University of Denmark）

Abstract

Problem definition: Novel life-improving products, such as solar lanterns and energy-efficient cookstoves address essential needs of consumers in the base of the pyramid (BOP). However, their profitable distribution is often difficult because BOP customers are risk-averse, their ability to pay (ATP) is lower than their willingness to pay, and they face uncertainty regarding these products’ value. Academic/practical relevance: We examine two practical strategies from distributors in the BOP: (1) improving the product’s affordability through a discount and (2) increasing awareness of the product’s value. Our results identify BOP-specific operational trade-offs in implementing these strategies. We also propose strategies to manage these trade-offs that can increase consumer surplus in the BOP. Methodology: We introduce a supply chain model for the BOP and analyze the distributor’s pricing problem with refunds as well as the distributor’s optimal budget allocation between strategies (1) and (2). Results: We find that, in the BOP, the distributor’s profit-maximizing budget allocation often yields the lowest consumer surplus. This misalignment between profits and consumer surplus disappears if customers’ ATP is high. Moreover, the misalignment can be resolved if the distributor offers free product returns and commits to a maximum retail price. We confirm the robustness of our results through numerical simulations. Managerial implications: Best operations strategy practices in the BOP can differ significantly from developed markets. Furthermore, BOP customers’ limited ATP and high risk aversion generate a BOP-specific misalignment between profits and consumer surplus. Operational commitments, such as free returns, reduce this misalignment and can serve as a signal to investors of a social enterprise’s focus on consumer surplus.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.1106

Managing Customer Search via Bundling

原刊和作者：

Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 2022年7月

Chenguang (Allen) Wu （Hong Kong University of Science and Technology）

Chen Jin （School of Computing, National University of Singapore）

Ying-Ju Chen （Hong Kong University of Science and Technology）

Abstract

Problem definition: Product bundling has been a pervasive marketing strategy, and its success has been largely attributed to its strength in reducing customers’ valuation dispersion. Less is known about the efficacy of bundling in settings where customers are less sure about their valuations for a product, especially when that product is newly launched or has an experience nature, and can conduct costly search to learn the product content and discover their true valuations. In this paper, we investigate the interplay between product bundling and customer search and its implications for a monopolist’s optimal pricing strategy. Academic/practical relevance: The existing search theory has focused on decision making that selects the best among multiple alternatives, with costly search being mandatory for the acquisition of each alternative. In this paper, we introduce a framework of multiproduct demands and nonobligatory search, where customers demanding multiple products strategically decide whether to conduct costly search to resolve valuation uncertainty, while reserving the right to purchase these products without having to search them first. Methodology: We apply a nonobligatory search framework to study two different markets: (1) a market of one mature and one new product, in which valuation uncertainty exists for the new product only; and (2) a market of two new products, in which valuation uncertainty exists for both products. The firm fully anticipates the customers’ search behaviors, determines whether to bundle these products or unbundle them, and optimally sets prices. Results: We show that bundling cultivates search in a market of one mature and one new product, but inhibits search in a market of two new products. This contrast emerges as a result of market structures: Bundling reduces the appeal of search by making the search decisions sequential and path-dependent in the latter market, but is less effective in doing so due to the existing heterogeneity in the former market. Our results thus point to an intricate interplay between customer search, market heterogeneity, and prices and their joint impact on the monopolist’s optimal bundling strategy. We also study mixed bundling and show that its economic benefits only carry through when customers’ search cost is not too large. In this case, mixed bundling can lead to considerable revenue improvement in a market of one mature and one new product, but only tiny revenue improvement in a market of two new products. We also study the joint management of product return and product bundling and show that a positive refund should generally be offered for returned products to stimulate customers’ no-search purchase. Managerial implications: Our paper provides guidance for firms selling multiple experience or new products. We propose product bundling to manage customer search, identifying regimes for its economic benefits and clarifying its implication for customer welfare.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2022.1082

Before It’s Too Late: Product Recall Delays and Policy Design

原刊和作者：

Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 2022年7月

Wenzheng Mao （Tongji University）

Zhanyu Dong （Sun Yat-sen University）

Hsiao-Hui Lee （National Chengchi University）

Abstract

Problem definition: We examine a firm’s investigation and recall decisions when a defect occurs and provide policy implications on how to deter long delayed recalls. Practical relevance: When a safety defect occurs, manufacturers often use product recalls to mitigate potential consequences. Although consumers expect on-time recalls for product defects, anecdotal examples suggest that firms may be passive in investigating potential defects and/or severely delay their recall decisions. Understanding how firms make their recall timing decisions has important business and social implications. Methodology: We study decisions on investigation efforts and recall timings for a profit-maximizing manufacturer by incorporating a Bass diffusion model to capture sales patterns for products with long life cycles. We then test our implications using data from the automobile industry and find supporting evidence. Results: We first find that a firm will consider a delayed recall when the defect is noticed early, when sales suffer more negative impacts from (external) media exposure on a recall, and when the product has a relatively high margin-to-recall-cost ratio. Second, a firm that will consider a delayed recall exerts a smaller investigation effort, and it will further reduce the effort when the defect is more likely to lead to a recall. When we consider the case in which a firm’s learning effect and information updating occur in an investigation and recall process, our results remain consistent. Managerial implications: Our model not only helps us understand how firms make their decisions when defects occur but also offers governments and regulatory bodies new instruments (e.g., investigation efforts, penalty design, information disclosure, firm supervision) to help firms be proactive should a defect occur, thereby reducing potential casualties associated with delays in a recall progress.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2021.1042

Distribution-Free Pricing

原刊和作者：

Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 2022年7月

Hongqiao Chen （Nanjing University）

Ming Hu （Universityof Toronto）

Georgia Perakis （Massachusetts Institute of Technology）

Abstract

Problem definition: We study a monopolistic robust pricing problem in which the seller does not know the customers’ valuation distribution for a product but knows its mean and variance. Academic/practical relevance: This minimal requirement for information means that the pricing managers only need to be able to answer two questions: How much will your targeted customers pay on average? To measure your confidence in the previous answer, what is the standard deviation of customer valuations? Methodology: We focus on the maximin profit criterion and derive distribution-free upper and lower bounds on the profit function. Results: By maximizing the tight profit lower bound, we obtain the optimal robust price in closed form as well as its distribution-free, worst-case performance bound. We then extend the single-product result to study the robust pure bundle pricing problem where the seller only knows the mean and variance of each product, and we provide easily verifiable, distribution-free, sufficient conditions that guarantee the pure bundle to be more robustly profitable than à la carte (i.e., separate) sales. We further derive a distribution-free, worst-case performance guarantee for a heuristic scheme in which customers choose between buying either a single product or a pure bundle. Moreover, we generalize separate sales and pure bundling to a scheme called clustered bundling that imposes a price for each part (i.e., cluster) of a partition of all products and allows customers to choose one or multiple parts (i.e., clusters), and we provide various algorithms to compute clustered bundling heuristics. In parallel, most of our results hold for the minimax relative regret criterion as well. Managerial implications: The robust price for a single product is in closed form under the maximin profit or minimax relative regret criterion and hence, is easily computable. Its interpretation can be easily explained to pricing managers. We also provide efficient algorithms to compute various mixed bundling heuristics for the multiproduct problem.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2021.1055

Queues with Redundancy: Is Waiting in Multiple Lines Fair?

Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 2022年7月

Leela Nageswaran （University of Washington）

Alan Scheller-Wolf （Carnegie Mellon University）

Abstract

Problem definition: We study service systems where some (so-called “redundant”) customers join multiple queues simultaneously, enabling them to receive service in any one of the queues, while other customers join a single queue. Academic/practical relevance: The improvement in overall system performance due to redundant customers has been established in prior work. We address the question of fairness—whether the benefit experienced by redundant customers adversely affects others who can only join a single line. This question is particularly relevant to organ transplantation, as critics have contended that multiple listing provides unfair access to organs for patients based on wealth. Methodology: We analyze two queues serving two classes of customers; the redundant class joins both queues, whereas the nonredundant class joins a single queue randomly. We compare this system against a benchmark wherein the redundant class resorts to joining the shortest queue (JSQ) if multiple queue joining were not allowed, capturing the most likely case if multilisting was prohibited: Affluent patients could still afford to list in the region with the shorter wait list. Results: We prove that when the arrival rate of nonredundant customers is balanced across both queues, they actually benefit under redundancy of the other class—that is, redundancy is fair. We also establish that redundancy may be unfair under some circumstances: Nonredundant customers are worse off if their arrival rate is strongly skewed toward one of the queues. We illustrate how these findings apply in the organ-transplantation setting through a numerical study using publicly available data. Managerial implications: Our analysis helps identify when, and by how much, multiple listing may be unfair and, as such, could be a useful tool for policy makers who may be concerned with trying to ensure equitable access to resources, such as organs, across patients with differing wealth levels.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2021.1052