本文精选了经济学领域国际顶刊《Journal of Political Economy》近期发表的论文，提供政治经济学研究领域最新的学术动态。

Interpreting Trends in Intergenerational Mobility

原刊和作者：

Journal of Political Economy Volume 132, Number 8

Martin Nybom （Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy Uppsala）

Jan Stuhler （Universidad Carlos III de Madrid）

Abstract

Studying a dynamic model of intergenerational transmission, we show that past events affect contemporaneous trends in intergenerational mobility. Structural changes may generate long-lasting mobility trends that can be nonmonotonic, and declining mobility may reflect past gains rather than a recent deterioration of equality of opportunity. We provide two applications. We first show that changes in the parent generation have partially offset the effect of rising skill premia on income mobility in the United States. We then show that a Swedish school reform reduced the transmission of inequalities in the directly affected generation but increased their persistence in the next.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1086/729582

Expectations, Infections, and Economic Activity

原刊和作者：

Journal of Political Economy Volume 132, Number 8

Martin Eichenbaum （Northwestern University）

Miguel Godinho de Matos （Universidade Católica Portuguesa）

Francisco Lima （Universidade de Lisboa）

Sergio Rebelo （Northwestern University）

Mathias Trabandt （Goethe University Frankfurt）

Abstract

This paper develops a quantitative theory of how people weigh the risks of infections against the benefits of engaging in social interactions that contribute to the spread of infectious diseases. Our framework takes into account the effects of public policies and private behavior on the spread of the disease. We evaluate the model using a novel micro panel dataset on consumption expenditures of young and older people across the first three waves of COVID-19 in Portugal. Our model highlights the critical role of expectations in shaping how human behavior influences the dynamics of epidemics.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1086/729449

A Ramsey Theory of Financial Distortions

原刊和作者：

Journal of Political Economy Volume 132, Number 8

Marco Bassetto （Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis）

Wei Cui （University College London）

Abstract

The return on government debt is lower than that of assets with similar payoffs. We study optimal debt management and taxation when the government cannot directly redistribute toward the agents in need of liquidity but otherwise has access to a complete set of linear tax instruments. Optimal government debt provision calls for gradually closing the wedge between the returns as much as possible, but tax policy may work as a countervailing force: as long as financial frictions bind, it can be optimal to tax capital even if this magnifies the discrepancy in returns.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1086/729446

The Morality of Markets

原刊和作者：

Journal of Political Economy Volume 132, Number 8

Mathias Dewatripont （Université Libre de Bruxelles）

Jean Tirole （Toulouse School of Economics and Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse）

Abstract

Scholars and civil society have argued that competition erodes supplier morality. This paper establishes a robust irrelevance result, whereby intense market competition does not crowd out consequentialist ethics; it thereby issues a strong warning against the wholesale moral condemnation of markets and procompetitive institutions. Intense competition, while not altering the behavior of profitable suppliers, may, however, reduce the standards of highly ethical suppliers or not-for-profits, raising the potential need to protect the latter in the marketplace.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1086/729445

The Effect of Incentives in Nonroutine Analytical Team Tasks

Journal of Political Economy Volume 132, Number 8

Florian Englmaier （Ludwig Maximilian University Munich）

Stefan Grimm （Ludwig Maximilian University Munich）

Dominik Grothe （Ludwig Maximilian University Munich）

David Schindler （Tilburg University）

Simeon Schudy （Ulm University）

Abstract

Despite the prevalence of nonroutine analytical team tasks in modern economies, little is understood regarding how incentives influence performance in these tasks. In a series of field experiments involving more than 5,000 participants, we investigate how incentives alter behavior in teams working on such a task. We document a positive effect of bonus incentives on performance, even among teams with strong intrinsic motivation. Bonuses also transform team organization by enhancing the demand for leadership. Exogenously increasing teams’ demand for leadership results in performance improvements comparable to those seen with bonus incentives, rendering it as a likely mediator of incentive effects.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1086/729443