学术前沿速递 |《The Accounting Review》论文精选

本文精选了会计学领域国际顶刊《The Accounting Review》近期发表的论文,提供会计学领域最新的学术动态。

 

Under the Hood of Activist Fraud Campaigns: Private Information Quality, Disclosure Incentives, and Stock Lending Dynamics

原刊和作者:

The Accounting Review Volume 99, Issue 6

Byung Hyun Ahn (Dimensional Fund Advisors)

Robert M. Bushman (The University of North Carolina)

Panos N. Patatoukas (University of California)

Abstract

Although activist short sellers can play a crucial role in fraud detection, they have come under scrutiny following accusations of systematically disseminating false negative information. We develop a framework delineating the roles of campaign-specific private information quality and short-selling dynamics in shaping disclosure incentives. We predict that the act of disclosure combined with pre-disclosure stock lending dynamics is informative about the quality of an activist’s private information. We find that increased pre-disclosure shorting intensity is associated with more negative post-disclosure returns, adverse media coverage, and consequential campaign outcomes, including auditor turnover, accounting restatements, class-action lawsuits, and performance-related delistings. Furthermore, elevated short-selling costs and risks magnify the association between pre-disclosure shorting intensity and post-disclosure underperformance. Finally, we examine V-shaped reversals and short covering following activists’ disclosures and find no evidence of systematic manipulation. We conclude that activists disclosing fraud allegations under their own names are discouraged from engaging in “short-and-distort” schemes.

Link: https://doi.org/10.2308/TAR-2023-0392

 

 

Strategic Disclosure Incentives in a Multisegment Firm

原刊和作者:

The Accounting Review Volume 99, Issue 6

Tyler Atanasov (Purdue University)

Abstract

This paper presents a unifying model of disclosure in the presence of competitors and supply market reliance to examine the role of multisegment operations on disclosure choice. A firm’s private information can have varying demand implications for its own portfolio of segments and for its competitors’ portfolios of segments. In multisegment firms, cross-firm spillovers of information discourage disclosure whereas cross-segment spillovers encourage disclosure. This suggests multisegment firms with more informationally diverse segments will have more incentives for transparency. Further, in multisegment firms, reliance on an imperfect supply market has less detrimental effects on transparency compared to single-segment firms. Supply market reliance is less detrimental for multisegment firms with a more diverse portfolio of segments. The results suggest that multisegment firms have more incentives for transparency relative to single-segment firms.

Link: https://doi.org/10.2308/TAR-2023-0155

 

 

Torpedo Your Competition: Strategic Reporting and Peer Firm IPO

原刊和作者:

The Accounting Review Volume 99, Issue 6

Matthew T. Billett (Indiana University Bloomington)

Mark Ma (Shuai) (University of Pittsburgh)

Xiaoyun Yu (Shanghai Jiao Tong University)

Abstract

A firm’s initial public offering (IPO) generates negative externalities for industry competitors. To mitigate this threat, incumbent firms manage their earnings downward, issue more negative management forecasts, and use a more negative disclosure tone when their industry peers file for an IPO. Negative accruals reverse when the threat subsides. Incumbents manage earnings more aggressively when costs are small and benefits are large, and when they follow negative disclosures of industry leading incumbents. Such strategic disclosure lowers incumbent firm valuation multiples and associates with more negative IPO firm media sentiment. IPO firms obtain lower offer prices, raise less capital, and are more likely to withdraw from the offering. They also invest less, hoard more cash, and experience lower profitability post-IPO, whereas incumbents experience higher profitability and market share growth. Our results highlight the role of strategic reporting on product market competition and identify a new cost of going public.

Link: https://doi.org/10.2308/TAR-2021-0447

 

 

Unintended Real Effects of EDGAR: Evidence from Corporate Innovation

原刊和作者:

The Accounting Review Volume 99, Issue 6

Michael Dambra (University at Buffalo)

Atanas Mihov (The University of Kansas)

Leandro Sanz (University of Notre Dame)

Abstract

We study the real effects on innovation of a transformative change in corporate disclosure dissemination, the implementation of the SEC’s EDGAR system. On the one hand, increased disclosure dissemination can lower firms’ cost of capital, thereby stimulating innovative activity. On the other hand, increased dissemination can exacerbate proprietary disclosure costs, reducing firms’ incentives to innovate. We show that treated firms reduce innovation investment following EDGAR’s implementation. In contrast, EDGAR reporting firms’ innovation investment cuts are met with an increase in innovation investment by their technology rivals. Consistent with an increase in proprietary costs, EDGAR-filers disclose less about their innovation activities. We also find evidence of a redistribution of innovative activity from public to private firms not subject to EDGAR disclosure requirements. Overall, our results are consistent with increased disclosure dissemination crowding out investment in innovative projects, whose returns negatively depend on information spillovers.

Link: https://doi.org/10.2308/TAR-2023-0310

 

 

Market Access and Retail Investment Performance

The Accounting Review Volume 99, Issue 6

Ed deHaan (Stanford University)

Andrew Glover (University of Washington)

Abstract

We examine the effects of stock market access, and in particular trading hours, on retail investment performance. Using discontinuities around time zone borders, we find that plausibly exogenous decreases in waking trading hours are associated with meaningful increases in retail investors’ capital gains, as reported on tax returns for the U.S. population. Our results indicate that limiting trading hours curbs active retail trading, leading to improvements in portfolio performance. Our findings identify one negative effect of decreasing barriers to entry for retail investors in trading markets.

Link: https://doi.org/10.2308/TAR-2023-0471

发布日期:2024-11-03浏览次数:
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