本文精选了会计与组织行为学国际顶刊《Accounting, Organizations and Society》近期发表的论文，提供会计与组织行为学领域最新的学术动态。

Infrapolitical resistance to management control in the home workplace

原刊和作者：

Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 116

Mohamed Chelli （University of Ottawa）

Darlene Himick （University of Ottawa）

Abstract

In this study, we examine how workers resist management controls in the home workplace. Drawing on Scott's (1985, 1990) theorization about the everyday forms of resistance, especially his seminal concepts of infrapolitical resistance and hidden transcripts, and mobilizing a netnographic approach, we examine the comments posted on Reddit during a 10-month period, in which workers talk about their resistance to the ways in which they are controlled in the home-based work environment. We uncover six hidden transcripts representing workers' infrapolitical resistance to management control in the home workplace, which we categorize into two sets: resistance thoughts and beliefs and individual acts of resistance. Home office workers describe and discuss their resistance attitudes and ideas around 1) the new limits of acceptable levels and types of controls, 2) the very worth of the managerial role, and 3) employers' cultural controls. Also, home office workers resist via their actions by 4) performing “empty labor; ” 5) quitting their job in response to return-to-office mandates; and 6) selectively meeting productivity-related controls. Bringing a new empirical site − the home as a workplace − to the management control literature, we theorize about the ways in which home office workers transform productivity into a site of resistance, turn the control gaze back on the managers, and use the home office to resist controls.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2025.101617

Can open audit committee chairs cure the chilling effect of management's presence on auditors' information sharing during audit committee meetings?

原刊和作者：

Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 116

Lukas J. Helikum （Singapore University of Social Sciences）

Karim Jamal （University of Alberta Edmonton）

Hun-Tong Tan （Nanyang Technological University）

Li Xiao （MacEwan University）

Abstract

This study experimentally examines how the leadership style of the audit committee (AC) chair (controlling or open) influences the amount of discretionary information that auditors intend to share with the AC, in the context of common meeting formats (i.e., AC meetings with versus without management present, or private meetings between the auditor and AC chair). Participants are highly experienced auditors, including partners and (senior) managers, from Big 4 accounting firms. We predict and find that an open AC chair mitigates the chilling effect of management's presence on the number of discretionary issues shared with the AC. Compared to those who attend AC meetings only, auditors who engage in private meetings with the AC chair before AC meetings plan to disclose fewer discretionary issues to the AC in subsequent AC meetings, but disclose more discretionary issues in total across meetings. AC chair leadership style has no impact on their discretionary information sharing in these private meetings. These results suggest that open AC chairs can mitigate the adverse effect of management's presence on auditors' discretionary information disclosure and have implications for regulators aiming to enhance corporate governance.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2025.101618

Voluntary managerial pay cuts and employee effort

原刊和作者：

Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 116

Christoph Feichter （WU Vienna University of Economics and Business）

Martin Wiernsperger （Cornell University）

Abstract

When managers voluntarily cut their own pay, it is often dismissed as symbolic gesture that employees do not care about. We conduct a series of four experiments to examine whether and how such pay cuts influence employee effort, and how the effect varies depending on two key design features: (1) how the forgone pay is used and (2) whether the pay cut is voluntary or externally imposed. Across our experiments, we find that managerial pay cuts increase employee effort, particularly when the forgone pay benefits employees or social causes, and when the cut is a voluntary act of self-sacrifice. Employees respond positively even when managers retain compensation through other channels, such as bonuses or stock awards. Our results suggest that the motivational effect is not only driven by reduced pay dispersion or material outcomes, but also by the perceived intention behind the manager's voluntary pay cut. Overall, our study shows that the gesture of managerial pay cuts can meaningfully influence employee behavior and enhance firm performance, and it identifies the conditions under which such effects are most likely to occur.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2025.101626

Expanding the analysis of accounting regulation: On the operationalization of disclosure regulation

原刊和作者：

Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 116

Dasha Smirnow （Lancaster University）

David J. Cooper （University of Alberta）

Abstract

We propose a more expansive analysis of accounting regulation, highlighting the significance of a regulatory network and the importance of examining the recursive processes involved in the transition from formal law to practice. Our analysis is grounded in the sociology of law and is exemplified by the case of a corporate disclosure regulation for Canada's extractive industry. The paper examines how the regulator, in concert with intermediary actors, works to clarify and influence the practice of law, what we refer to as operationalization. In providing a historically and socially contextualized analysis, the paper treats regulation as a dynamic process that includes multistakeholder working groups, legislative debates, regulatory procedures, and shifting meanings of compliance and enforcement. We examine operationalization as a distinct regulatory dynamic and explore its significance for an expanded understanding of accounting regulation.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2025.101627

The effect of political connections on COVID-19 stimulus

Accounting, Organizations and Society, Volume 116

John Barrick （Brigham Young University）

Adam Olson （University of Cincinnati）

Shiva Rajgopal （Columbia University）

Abstract

We investigate whether corporate political activity (CPA) benefited organizations during the distribution of COVID-19 stimulus funds. Using data on three mechanisms of political influence—lobbying expenditures, PAC contributions, and trade association lobbying—we analyze their impact on the most extensive stimulus package in U.S. history. Our findings reveal that publicly listed firms engaging in CPA were significantly more likely to receive COVID-19 stimulus support. Compared to firms without political activity, the odds of receiving government assistance were 91.5 % higher for firms that lobbied directly, 148.9 % higher for those contributing to PACs, and 112.1 % higher for those lobbying through trade associations. Financial returns on political influence were $0.11 per dollar spent on lobbying, $7.26 per dollar for PAC contributions, and $2.40 per dollar spent on trade association lobbying. Notably, returns were two to four times greater when CPA targeted specific policymakers or agencies responsible for fund disbursement. We find some evidence of an association between CPA and reduced stimulus efficiency or effectiveness at the agency level. Our study highlights the financial impact of political influence during stimulus events in times of global uncertainty, emphasizing the need for further research into its implications for policymaking.

Link: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2025.101630