Game analysis between governmen t branches and util ity en terpr ises
DOI:
Author:
Affiliation:

Clc Number:

Fund Project:

  • Article
  • |
  • Figures
  • |
  • Metrics
  • |
  • Reference
  • |
  • Related
  • |
  • Cited by
  • |
  • Materials
  • |
  • Comments
    Abstract:

    In th is paper, som e econom ic characterist ics of pub lic u t ility en terp rises are summ ed up , a model of p rincipal2agen t theo ry betw een governm en t b ranches and the en terp rises is p ropo sed. It is p roved th rough the gam e analysis that the governm en t budget po licy is the key reason to arise st im u lat ion feeb le and co st increasing fo r the en terp rises under the p laned econom ic system. The in it ial refo rm , though w ith som e defect s, imp roved the eff iciency of the u t ility en terp rises, and show s that it shou ld be an inevitab le layou t fo r u t ility en terp rises to estab lish modern en terp rises system and to fo rm alize the p rincipal2agen t relat ion sh ip betw een the governm en t b ranches and pub lic en terp rises.

    Reference
    Related
    Cited by
Get Citation
Share
Article Metrics
  • Abstract:
  • PDF:
  • HTML:
  • Cited by:
History
  • Received:
  • Revised:
  • Adopted:
  • Online:
  • Published:
You are the th visitor Address:Room 908, Building A, 25th Teaching Building, Tianjin University, 92 Weijin Road, Nankai District, Tianjin Postcode:300072
Telephone:022-27403197 Email:jmsc@tju.edu.cn