We explain in theory how different kinds of private benefits of control represent different coherency of shareholders’benefits，under ultimate control structure of China's listed companies，and study the different effect of these private benefits of control on the value of a company using data of China’s stock market from 1998 to 2006． We find that，firstly，there are excessive private benefits of control and reasonable private bene-fits of control in China's listed companies． Secondly，excessive private benefits of control characterized by en-trenchment or expropriation would reduce the value of a company and has negative impact on the value of a company，in contrast with this，reasonable private benefits of control characterized by compensation and pro-motion would increase the value of a company and has positive effect on the value of a company． Further more，the separating degree of company control right affects those process differently，with low separating de-gree having positive effect，but high separating degree having negative effect． These findings support the pri-mary inference and are useful to further studies in corporation governance．