In this paper，governor and manager and institution condition are taken as a system，and based on agent theory，we simulate the influence of environmental factors，including the type of manager’s power and punishment strength，on the relation between the rate of governor changing supervision level and distorted information of strategic performance． The results indicate that，( 1) when the power is impermanent and contested to the manager，governors should slightly enhance supervision level regardless of the punishment strength， which leads to minimum level of distorted information of strategic performance． ( 2) When the power is institutionalized and perpetual，governors should slightly enhance supervision level in the background of severe punishment，and moderately change supervision level in the background of mild punishment． ( 3) When the increase in supervision level is drastic，the manager，whose power is impermanent and contested，could be prompted to manipulate strategic performance information． And it is reversed to manager in the institutionalization and perpetuation of power．