The issue of the asking price ( AP) before trading has received much attention from economists．Most of the existing literature argues that AP can be used as a signal of the seller’s reservation price or pro_x005fduction cost，which is the private value of the seller．Little attention is paid to the relationship between the AP and the quality of an asset，which is a common value of the seller．We examine the signaling mechanism of the AP under bilateral asymmetric information．We find that，given that the trade opportunity shrinks with increas_x005fing quality，there are two contrasting effects with the change of the AP: the price effect and the trade effect．The marginal rate of substitution between the trade effect and the price effect is higher for the seller with a lower quality asset．This means that the single-crossing condition is satisfied in this bilateral asymmetric information game．Given the boundary condition is satisfied，there is a unique separating equilibrium．A seller with a lower quality has an incentive to signal the quality with a lower AP，and it is reasonable to expect a higher quality from assets with a higher AP．All possible trades will be accomplished in this unique separating equilibrium despite the informational asymmetry．