The continuous innovation serves as the engine of an enterprise and the product rollover strategy is critical when a firm sequentially launches new products． As frequent product introductions are common in many industries，consumers become more and more sophisticated when choosing the purchase time based on their anticipation of future options． In a two-period-game model，we characterize the rational expectations equilibrium，where we show the market segmentations，the firm’s optimal pricing，and rollover strategy． When the market size is stable over two periods，pricing penetration with dual rollover strategy is more appealing than pricing skimming with single rollover under slower technical obsolescence and larger proportion of high-end consumers． A potential growth of the market size in the second period would make the firm more profitable in the first period with pricing penetration because i) a higher price can be set in the first period and ii) the consumers’strategic waiting can be mitigated due to the possibility of a single rollover strategy．