Competition mechanism of manufacture / remanufacture considering govern-ment subsidies
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    Abstract:

    The game model between an original equipment manufacturer ( OEM) and a remanufacturer is es-tablished considering government subsidies for“exchanging the old with a remanufactured one”. The effects of three different policies - no government subsidy at all,government subsidizing the remanufacturer,government subsidizing the consumers of remanufactured products - on the wholesale prices,retail prices,sales volume,profit,consumer surplus,and environments are compared and analyzed. The results are: when the demand for remanufactured products is not limited to recycled used products,government subsidies could reduce the unit retail price for the two products,increase the profits of remanufacturers and retailers,and raise consumer sur-plus; when the demand of remanufactured products is limited to recycled used products,government subsidy could increase the wholesale price of the two products and the profit of OEM and remanufacturer,and reduce the retailer’s sales profit.

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  • Online: April 14,2018
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