Decision-making of online channel from the viewpoint of game theory
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    Abstract:

    A cross-decision and competition-cooperation model constituted by an online retailer and a franchi-see is formulated. The model takes the existing operation mode of the online retail platforms as a reference and takes the online channel as the object of the research. Meanwhile,the consumer’s utility function which is af-fected by price and service simultaneously is defined from the perspective of consumers. First of all,the equi-libria of three power structures—the online retailer and the franchisee as the stackelberg leader respectively and that they are equal in power—are obtained according to the optimization method and game theory. Then, these equilibria are compared with each other to give the decision makers some references under the online channel. The results reveal that whether the dominator can realize the optimization or not is restricted by cer-tain conditions,and that the follower can always realize the optimization according to the dominator’s deci-sions. While,participants will always achieve the optimization at the same time if their powers are equal to each other. The results also suggest that the sensitivity of consumers to service has a positive impact on the price,service,and demand. At last,the numerical simulation further refines the analysis and its findings pro-vide some references to participants.

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  • Online: April 14,2018
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