This study considers fairness’s effect on the pricing decisions in a two-echelon supply chain with one supplier and one retailer． The supplier decides the wholesale price of the single product firstly，and then the retailer decides the selling price after accepting supplier’s contract． Finally，the market demand is real-ized as a linear function of selling price unless the retailer rejects supplier’s contract and then both echelons will receive nothing． Based on the managerial experiment，this study indicates that: ( i) both of the supplier’ s wholesale price and the retailer’s selling price are lower than the theoretical results under perfect rationality assumption; ( ii) specifically，the supplier is altruistic and believes that the retailer selfishly aims at maximi-zing his own profit，however，the retailer is spiteful; ( iii) the coefficient of variability of the wholesale price is larger than that of the selling price． The managerial insights are that in the two-echelon supply chain，the sup-plier should adjust his belief on retailer’s fairness concern as being spiteful instead of being selfish，and more decision-making support methods should be provided to the supplier to improve the quality of the wholesale price decision．