The mitigation tournament game under heterogeneous generators competition in electricity markets is studied by using behavioral economics． The equilibrium marginal probabilities of winning and the optimal mitigation efforts in different market and bonus structures are discussed successively． Theoretical models are experimentally tested from the perspective of experimental economics and the models are extended to tournament models of mitigation considering non-pecuniary factors such as social comparison which also affects a generator’s mitigation decision． The optimal parameter estimations and equilibrium predictive values of generalized models are given． The results gained through comparative analysis indicate that increasing the number of winning prizes，regardless of the generation subject compositions，neither drives superiors to raise nor forces the vulnerable to decrease respective mitigation quantities in a tournament with three or four participants． No matter what the initial dispatching endowments are，all generators present overinvestment behaviors as long as the experiment information is completely public． Contrary to the standard theory predictions，the levels of the latter’s mitigation efforts are positively correlated with number of winners when a single vulnerable and double superior generators compete． The parameter constraints reduce the fitness of the behavioral economics model significantly and the equilibrium prediction of generalized model fits the basic features of test experiment best in contrast with the specific nested model which verifies the feasibility of the theoretical predictions．