Investors can sell short on designated stocks in China’s stock market since March 2010 when the CSＲC relieved the short sale constraint． The paper provides a quasi-natural experiment to examine whether short selling pressure can discipline the controlling shareholder’s exploitation． Using a sample of Chinese listed firms during 2007 － 2014，the results show that short selling pressures from the removal of the short sale constraints have a governance effect on the pursuit of private benefit of controlling shareholders． Downside risk is the economic mechanism through which short-selling threat disciplines the controlling shareholders． The governance effect from short sale is much stronger when other corporate governance mechanisms are weak． The cross-sectional tests suggest that the higher the proportion of shares the controller holds or the higher bankruptcy risk of the firm faces，the more reduction in the exploitation of controllers in pilot firms after the removal of short sale constraint． This paper provides further insight into the discipline effect of short selling on controlling shareholders in pursuing private benefits，and contributes to the literature on the effects of the removal of the short selling constraints on the real economy．