Price discrimination and allocation efficiency with revenue-sharing contracts
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F274

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    Abstract:

    Different from literatures in supply chain management which focuses on the role of revenue-sharing contract in coordinating supply chains,this paper mainly studies the effect of such contracts on upstream suppliers’pricing decisions,allocation efficiency and social welfareResults show that: in supply chains coordinated by a revenue-sharing contract,an upstream supplier imposes discriminatory pricing to downstream heterogeneous manufactures,which,along with downstream efficiency and product substitution,affects the allocation efficiency and social welfare.Though revenue-sharing can increase joint profits through coordination,the effect on consumer surplus and social welfare is ambiguous.This paper also discusses the effect of firms’relative bargaining power on the revenue-sharing proportion,and identifies factors affecting the revenue-sharing parameter.Finally,based on the analyzed results,it is suggested that,as a means of vertical restraint,the anti-trust examination on revenue-sharing should adopt the“rule of reason”rather than“per se illegal”.

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  • Online: October 25,2021
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