In this paper，regulatory penalty and regulatory forbearance are incorporated into the deposit insurance pricing model under the framework of Merton ( 1978) ． The relationship between deposit insurance price and risk preference of bank is analyzed． Initially，there is a negative relation between premium rate of deposit insurance and the asset-deposit ratio of bank． When the intensity of regulatory penalty is larger，the risk preference of bank becomes smaller and the premium rate of deposit insurance is smaller． It means that regulatory penalty plays an important role in keeping the finance system stable． In addition，the risk preference of banks and the premium rate of deposit insurance are both larger when the coefficient of regulatory forbearance is smaller． Moreover，the premium rate of deposit insurance of city banks was greatly affected by both the subprime crisis in 2008 and the stock market crash in 2015，while that of state-owned banks was almost not affected，and that of joint-stock banks was affected to a very minor degree．