The paper explores licensing and development strategies of platform licensors and licensees in a competitive high-tech market. A game-theoretic model is constructed to describe the competition and cooperation between the two firms, exploring the conditions for their different strategies and analyzing their optimal pricing decisions in different market configurations. The results show that it is more profitable for the licensor to adopt the license cancellation strategy if the product value of the licensor is sufficiently higher than that of the licensee. Under these conditions, the licensee should develop a new software platform in the first period to avoid being driven out of the current market. However, when the product value advantage of the licensor decreases to a moderate range, the license continuation strategy is optimal for the platform licensor if the licensee develops a new software platform in the first stage. Conversely, the license cancellation strategy is optimal if the licensee does not develop a new software platform. Under the above conditions, the licensee should develop a new platform. When the product value advantage of the licensor decreases to a small range, the licensor will adopt the license continuation strategy, regardless of whether the platform licensee develops a new platform. The licensee chooses not to develop a new platform and continues to adopt the licensing platform. Finally, when the licensor’s value advantage continues to decrease or even become negative, reflecting that the licensor is at a disadvantage in product value, the licensor should always adopt the license continuation strategy. Under such circumstances, it is more profitable for the licensee to develop and adopt its own software platform.