Abstract:As an important macroprudential policy tool, stress tests have increasingly become an important topic in the discussion of financial regulation. However, it is still unclear whether stress tests have achieved the purpose of enhancing China’s financial stability. 〖JP3〗This paper uses banks that participated in the central bank’s〖JP〗 stress tests from 2012 to 2019 as the research sample, constructs the “stress tests exposure” indicator for these banks based on the stress tests results disclosed in the China Financial Stability Report, and empirically examines the effect of the above macroprudential policy on the risktaking of the participating banks and the possible underlying channels. The results show that an increase in “stress tests exposure” induces the participating banks to take less risk, in the form of a lower level of passive risktaking rather than active risktaking. This effect is more significant among stateowned (large) banks. As the stress level increases, the participating banks reduce their exposure to traditional credit assets and increase their exposure to shadow banking assets. The adjustment of risky asset portfolios varies across bank types. As “stress tests exposure” increases, nonstateowned (small and mediumsized) banks significantly reduce loans to highrisk industries but increase shadow banking assets to avoid supervision, while stateowned (large) banks tend to actively reduce their shadow banking activities. This study helps to deepen the understanding of the effectiveness of regulatory actions and macroprudential policies, and is of great value for policy makers in improving and regulating regulatory rules.