This study investigates a dedication-timing game and provides theoretical predictions, experimental designs, and empirical analyses for the dilemma of public goods provision, incorporating the timing aspect that often prevails in reality. The results show that individuals’ dedication behavior is significantly affected by the information environment. Compared with an imperfect information environment, in which the timing of public goods activities cannot be observed, both the expected initiation time of the activity and the expected participation time of group members occur earlier when timing information is perfectly observable in real time. However, the likelihood of public goods provision is lower under perfect information. Overall, higher social welfare is achieved in the perfect information environment than in the imperfect one. This study not only provides theoretical support and empirical evidence for these findings but also highlights the important role of the information environment in shaping policy objectives. Specifically, policies aimed at promoting the coverage of public goods provision should limit information diffusion, whereas policies targeting the timeliness of provision should foster an open and transparent information environment.