Interest subsidies to banks and enterprises are two types of green financial incentives supported by the government to aid enterprises in their low-carbon transition. This paper investigates green loan pricing decisions of a bank in perfectly competitive and monopolistic financial markets, as well as the production and carbon emission reduction decisions of a capital-constrained enterprise. Then, this paper compares the economic-environmental values contributed by green credit under two incentive policies. The research finds that:1) The enterprise’s emission-reduction technology level, initial capital size, and carbon asset jointly affect the economic-environmental values of green credit. Moreover, there exist parameter regions in which green credit results in positive economic and environmental values; 2) When the enterprise borrows without default risk, the two interest subsidies are equivalent from economic and environmental perspectives; 3) When the enterprise borrows with default risk and the bank is in a perfectly competitive financial market, subsidizing the bank is superior to subsidizing the borrower from both economic and environmental perspectives; the converse holds when the bank is in a monopolistic financial market.