In the context of comprehensively advancing the rule of law, the question of how the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) promotes state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to deeply implement the requirements of “comprehensive rule of law in enterprises” through compliance supervision policies has gradually become a focus of academic attention. This paper constructs a quasi-natural experiment based on the issuance of the “Compliance Management Guidelines (Trial)” by SASAC to empirically examine the impact and mechanism of compliance management on the internal control of SOEs from the perspective of institutional spillover. The study finds that compliance management has an institutional spillover effect that enhances the level of internal control in SOEs, and this impact can spill over from central SOEs to local SOEs. Mechanism analysis indicates that when external transaction costs and internal control costs are high, SOEs are more motivated to enhance their internal control levels according to compliance supervision policy requirements. Furthermore, the institutional spillover effect of compliance management can further reduce operational and compliance risks in SOEs. This research not only reveals the mechanism by which compliance supervision policies impact the internal control of SOEs and the economic consequences of risk prevention and control, but also provides micro-level evidence for integrating compliance management, internal control, and risk management. It has significant policy value for improving the standards of compliance supervision and internal control, thereby promoting the high-quality development of state-owned assets and enterprises.