Abstract:In this paper，governor and manager and institution condition are taken as a system，and based on agent theory，we simulate the influence of environmental factors，including the type of manager’s power and punishment strength，on the relation between the rate of governor changing supervision level and distorted information of strategic performance． The results indicate that，( 1) when the power is impermanent and contested to the manager，governors should slightly enhance supervision level regardless of the punishment strength， which leads to minimum level of distorted information of strategic performance． ( 2) When the power is institutionalized and perpetual，governors should slightly enhance supervision level in the background of severe punishment，and moderately change supervision level in the background of mild punishment． ( 3) When the increase in supervision level is drastic，the manager，whose power is impermanent and contested，could be prompted to manipulate strategic performance information． And it is reversed to manager in the institutionalization and perpetuation of power．

Abstract:Previous studies mainly concentrated in the rationalcognitive decisionmaking process，few focused on the emotional issues． In recent years，accompanied by people' s concern about emotional intelligence， group emotional intelligence also aroused the interests of researchers． Through the review of past research，we proposed the conceptual model of group emotional intelligence． We also explore the mechanism of the effects of group emotional intelligence on group decisionmaking behaviors and outcomes with experiment method． The experiment study involved 55 groups，which was designed as a 2 × 2 factorial design． Results show that: ( a) High GAEI groups will show a higher level of GEI in the following interactive process; ( b) High GLEI groups will show a higher level of GROE in the following interactive process; ( c) High GAEI groups tend to take more cooperative behaviors and less competitive behaviors than low GAEI groups; ( d) High GAEI groups will experience higher levels of process satisfaction and cohesion than low GAEI groups． The conclusions offer references for enhancing emotional management capacity and problemsolving abilities of decisionmaking groups．

Abstract:Managerial hedging by nonexclusive equity swaps can reduce ex post incentive of the contract，and affect the firm value and risk thereafter． Under the assumption that the manager can affect both the firm value and firm risk simultaneously，we analyze dynamic game equilibrium of the incentive contract and nonexclusive equity swaps contract． The results indicate that when the efficiency of the manager’s effort exceeds a key point，hedging will not reduce the incentive.Otherwise，the degree of reduced equilibrium incentive is decreasing with the cost of effort，risk aversion of trading party and trading cost，but is increasing with the cost of risk control，the capability and risk aversion of the manager． The optimal incentive is decreasing with both costs of effort and risk control，the risk aversions of the manager and trading party，and the trading cost; Further，we find the optimal trading size is not always increasing with risk aversion of managers and the incentive in the presence of endogenous firm risk． Finally，with the practice of stockbased compensation，we illustrate the meaning and importance of our research．

Abstract:As the most basic feature of service industry，interaction is defined as the mutual action and influence among various objects． After reviewing the recent researches of service brand equity，twelve main interaction factors among service enterprises，employees and customers are drawn out． Then an analytical framework of service brand equity based on multidimensional interaction is established，and an exploratory empirical study in four service industries of Guangzhou is conducted，where the influence of those twelve factors on service brand equity is presented through gray relation analysis． It is proved that multidimensional interaction is the root cause of the swing of service brand equity，also the features of service enterprise’brand building， which is still in the primary stage in China，is reflected．

Abstract:This paper focuses on the investors’behavioural biases and their preference property in the Chinese stock market，and further confirms the reference price for investors． The results show that macroeconomic factors affect investors’preferences． Before the splitshare structure reform，investors preferred to ride losers too long，and sell winners too early． However，after the reform，investors tend to hold the gains． On the other side，house money effect weakens the disposition effect． This study also finds that the investors consider both dynamic costs and highest stock price as their reference point． While considering individual’s behavioural biases，the stoploss strategy，which helps the investors earn more money，is more predominant than the holding strategy．

Abstract:By using the methods of equilibrium theory and variational inequality，we discuss closed loop supply chain network including manufacturers，retailers /recycling centers and demand markets with combination of forward and reverse flow under EPR． The interactions among various decisionmakers in the model coupled with the incorporation of environmental policies such as endoflife ( EOL) products emission taxes is analyzed． A multilayer supply chain network equilibrium model in Competitive Environments is built． We describe the competitive behavior of the various decisionmakers． We present the equilibrium conditions of every layer and the system，economic interpretations and establish the finite dimensional variational inequality formulation． Finally，three numerical examples are solved using the proposed algorithm to illustrate the validity of the model along with a discussion．

Abstract:This paper investigates the allocation mechanisms in inbound logistics system consisting of single supplier，single manufacturer and multiple third party logistics providers． The aim is to compare profit sharing and cost allocation in two outsourcing modes，direct outsourcing and lead logistics partner ( LLP) ． Multiprincipal and multiagent models are applied to investigate the system and solution procedures are proposed． Comparing the profit of all parties，results reveal that the manufacturer can obtain more profits in LLP mode than direct outsourcing，and the extra profits are generated from specialized management of LLP． When LLP’s reserved utility is the same with direct sourcing mode，the extra profits contributed by LLP are deprived and allocated between the manufacturer and the supplier． When LLP increases its reserved utility，it can share the extra profits with the manufacturer，and its income is the same with direct outsourcing mode．

Abstract:In this article，an innovation pole，which is represented in innovation scale and drives the development of regional economy，is defined as a regional industrial innovation subsystem producing dense innovative activities． We regard the regional innovation system as a symbiosis evolution system of the multiinnovation poles． Then，in the framework of ecology theory，this article analyses the symbiosis evolution model of multiinnovation poles and sets up the dynamic model of the multiinnovation poles symbiosis evolution system． Finally，we draw the conclusion through the simulation study that: different values of the symbiosis coefficient are the only difference between regional innovation systems besides the strength or weakness of innovation poles．