Abstract:The distributor is only assumed to engage in collecting the used product and selling the product in previous literatures related to the distributor in the closedloop chain． However，this paper initially demonstrates the closedloop supply chain model where the distributor engages in remanufacturing，and we characterize its optimal pricing decisions of both producers． This paper demonstrates that，compared with the model that the distributor does not remanufacture，the producers can both benefit from the distributor’s remanufacturing; compared with the model that the manufacturer engages in remanufacturing，the former can benefit the distributor and the latter benefit the manufacturer from the perspective of the producer’s profit while the former is better than the latter from the perspective of the market’s profit，under which the manufacturer can transfer part of the profit of the distributor to herself on the premise that both the producers earn more than before． Further，the former case increases the consumers’welfare and accelerates the development of the remanufacturing．

Abstract:Customers who purchase a new or innovative product face product fit risks，this risk can be reduced by customer experiences． We consider two forms of contracts that characterized opposite natures: sales rebate contract，in which supplier compensates sellers for the units that are sold，and buyback contract，in which supplier compensates sellers for the units that are unsold． We find that enhancing customer exogenous experiences so that customers can obtain more accurate information indicating his type of maximum willingness to pay，the seller’s price is higher，and supply chain coordination，the seller’s as well as supplier’s profits are higher; whereas enhancing customer endogenous experiences so that customers can obtain more refund for return，supply chain coordination as well as supplier’s profits will decrease． We also show that supply chain coordination cannot be achieved by sales rebate contract，however，buyback contract achieves supply chain coordination，and this contract can allocate supply chain total profits arbitrarily between the supplier and the seller by negotiating wholesale price．

Abstract:Inventory pledge financing in the innovative mode of logistics finance can effectively solve capital bottleneck in the supply chain and has a lot scope to develop． However，it is seriously constrained by the level of risk control． This paper focuses on loantovalue ratios，i． e． the core indicator of risk in seasonal inventory financing in the uniform credit mode． Based on the features of this mode and the relevant costbenefit structure，we build a newsvendor model with financial constraints and analyze reordering decisions made by riskneutral borrowers． Then，based on a dynamic Stackelberg game between borrowers and logistics enterprises， we investigate loantovalue ratio decisions of downsideriskadverse logistics enterprises． The results show that in uniform credit mode，downsideriskaverse logistics enterprises should set loantovalue ratios according to different borrowers’reordering plans and then make their optimal decisions． Moreover，for the borrowers with different initial inventory，downsiderisk limits affect the optimal decision of logistics enterprises differently．

Abstract:In view of policy impacts，big volatility and possible structural changes in Chinese short rate，this paper proposes a jumpdiffusionregime switching model，and then uses it to study volatility，jump and regime switch effects in Chinese 7day interbank offered rates，we find there exists not only meanreversion but also jump and regime switch effects in the rate ． The model is much better than any other nested models that only consider two effects． We also find the level effects and ARCH effects in volatility are negligible in highvolatility regime，and the level effects can be omitted in lowvolatility regime． Additionally，the jump exhibits clustering effects． High( low) jump probability and high( low) regime probability are matched with high( low) interest rate and high( low) volatility，jump almost occurs in high regime probability．

Abstract:Investment institution can take asset allocation strategy to change the risk of insolvency，which is caused by return guarantees，thereby，according to the principle of the consistency of risk and value，the value of return guarantees is changed． Available papers study the value of return guarantees without considering asset allocation strategy． This paper proposes a new approach combined with asset allocation strategy and return guarantee is set to a new form． We calculate the value of multiperiod return guarantees under constantmix， deterministic lifestyle and constant proportion portfolio insurance strategies respectively． The results show that:( 1) The asset allocation strategy and strategy parameters used return guarantee; asset allocation; constant proportion portfolio insurancey investment institutions are important factors affecting the value of return guarantees，and the hedge strategy used by investment institutions will reduce the value of return guarantees; ( 2) The value of multiperiod return guarantees change largely with the periods of multiperiod return guarantees．

Abstract:In the paper，we study the problems of information and efficiency in terms of market transactions． The main results include: 1) Presenting the conception of market information variety and information gathering and providing mathematical description of information gathering; 2) Setting up the living bargain model of imperfect market bargain games and Bellman equation of multiple transaction; 3 ) Proving market information gathering effect，which increases returns and raises market liquidity． That is the more important values and mechanism of market information，than only increasing resources dispose through solving multiple equilibrium and reducing transaction costs． It is also proved that information is not an abstractive market factor but internal value resource． Function of information can have some effect on efficiency and increase total values due to decreasing transaction time ( searcher time and bargain games) ．

Abstract:The essential problem for pricing structured financial products is how to determine profit functions， and the main key to pricing technically is how to handle the correlation between assets． The paper expounds: firstly，the correlation between assets can be solved by means of Cholesky decomposition，secondly，a multiasset product with guaranteed capital by equitylinked structure is priced by means of Monte Carlo according to its characteristics of profit functions，and lastly，the the method is applied to the case of Shenzhen City Commercial Bank Yingfeng financial product 0706，in which the research shows while the actual product pricing is high，the product earnings are lower．

Abstract:It is assumed in the paper that stock price is determined not only by fundamental uncertainty but also by market nonfundamental ( extraneous) uncertainty and firm idiosyncratic nonfundamental ( extraneous) uncertainty，and the assumption is set that for different kinds of uncertainty different investors hold different kinds of heterogeneous beliefs． Thererhence，a dynamic equilibrium model in the continuous time pure exchange economy is presented． It is found that besides the fundamental uncertainty，market extraneous uncertainty and firm idiosyncratic extraneous uncertainty can also give explanations to expected returns． Furthermore，the model provides another explanation for some anomalies found in equity market，especially for anomaly of idiosyncratic volatility．

Abstract:By analyzing the enterprise investment behaviors under different allocations of control rights，we study the relationship between the allocation of control rights and the inefficient investment behaviors under the condition of large shareholder controlling． And a empirical study by the sample data of the listed companies during 2000—2008 are used to verify our conclusion． We show that in the case of one large shareholder controlling，the overinvestment behavior is anticorrelated with share proportion，while the underinvestment is correlated with the proportion of the large shareholder． In the case of multiple shareholders controlling，the inefficient investment behaviors depend on whether the relationship of the shareholders is monitoring or cooperating: the overinvestment is alleviated and the underinvestment is accentuated if shareholders monitoring each other，while the overinvestment is accentuated and the investmentdeficiency is alleviated if shareholders cooperate with each other．