Abstract:The sequence of introduction of different technologies or product is affected by the difference in technology level (productquality) and investment cost between two technologies or products,and the preference of market. By taking in to consideration of the factors of the preference of market, the difference in technology level,and product quality and cost, this paper constructs a real option model to analyze the equilibrium of competition investment strategy, and cooperation investment of two competitive firms.This study shows that,(1)firms, either with a high quality and high cost,or a low quality and low cost,may become a leader; further the larger the quality difference, the shorter the interval between the two competition firms; and the higher market preference, the longer the interval between to two competition firmsthe.(2)As a result of cooperation investment,the low quality technology always appears first, and then the high quality one.Inthe two cases of cooperation investment and competition investment, the interval of the introduction ofcorresponding technologies increases with the of the cost difference,decreases with the quality difference, and increases with of market preference.

Abstract:Our paper has analyzed and compared cooperative R＆D and non-cooperative R＆D ons tandard-oriented technology. According to whether afirm coordinates R＆D investment and informatio nsharing, we have classified modes of innovation on standard-oriented technology into four types,which are complete R＆D competition, patentpool,pureR＆D cooperationand R＆D cooperation with patent pool.Based on the two classi cal models, we have developed a new model to discuss the performace of the above four modes.Some new finding sare:On theonehand, the mechanism of over coming the externaly of information sharing on the R＆D investment is partly different from that of the externality of R＆D investment; On the other hand, none of the four modes is superior to the other three. echnology spillover is only one of the key middle factors that de-terminate which mode is the best and it is dependent on the character of the industry.

Abstract:Agent-based simulation for interaction behavior between group and work was explored from an evolutionary game-theoretical perspective.This paper develops a pay off-shared andunishment-shared game mode,l design evolution learning rules considering of historical information and decisioncharacteristicofneigh-bor,sand uses multiagent approach to represent groupwork.Based on class libof Repas,tweuseJava2 to program the multi-agent simulation system.Simulation results indicate that(1)the size of work group has a minor effect on cooperation trend and major effect on cooperation frequency of group, (2)total work pay off bhasa positive effect on the stability of work state of group.Group behavior is inastate of Tit-for-Tat when work costci sequivalent to work punishment, more player swant to cooperate when c>d, and vice versa, the more players wants to defec twhen c

Abstract:Basing on the“ B-Z ”reaction model characterized by typical serf-organization，this paper analyzes the self-organization rules of enterprise system evolution with synergetic theory which is generally applied to analyze complex giant systems．The results show that studies of applying complex science methods to solve the problem of uncertain economy system are gradually progressing．but most studies remain on qualitative description or constructing simple two-dimensional variable model to simulate the phase of enterprise system evolution．By introducing“B-Z”reaction model，this paper constructs a three-dimensional variable model to describe enterprise system quantitatively，which makes the evolution rules more objective and practical，and airpries adiabatic elimination principle of synergetic theory to the problem of complex calculation caused by increased variable dimension．The combination of synergetic methods and“B-Z”reaction model is a new idea in the study of enterprise system evolution，and a favorable theoretical support for the further related study．

Abstract:Petroleum reserve is an important way to control the risk of petroleum supply chain. This paper develops a linear programming model for the operations management of petroleum supply chain, then it is applied to simulating the value of 30, 60 and 90 day' s strategic petroleum reserve under different increases of demand or crude oil price. The results show that strategic petroleum reserve can effectively control the increase of supply chain operational cost when big fluctuations occur， and the effects are different if the scale of strategic petroleum reserve is changed.

Abstract:House prices in China recently flucate acutely and this paper focuses on real estate market mechaism by establishing models to explain this phenomena.The model includes investutility, second-hand marke,trational expectation, unrational expectation and policy impulse.This model outlines a dynamic real estate market' s mechanism.We argue that unrational expectation magnifies fluctuations of house prices. Conversely, rational expectation is the self-regulator of the real estate price.When marke't s unrational expectation dominates rational expectation, the ratchet wheel of the price fluctuating cannot stop in a shortterm.This maybe one of the essential reason for Chinese real estate price keep fluctuating acutely.

Abstract:We use a natural experiment occurring on HongKong stock market to examine the effects of removing short sales constraints ons everal trading charact eristics of underlying stocks.We find that the trading of underlying stocks become less active after the lift of short sales constraints; Meanwhile the liquidity of underlying stocks is tightenedand the information a symmetry among the investors aggravates. But we fail to findany evidence indicating that the lift of short sales constraints seriously destabilizes the market.We further provide astoryofnoise traders to explain these empirical findings.

Abstract:n recent years, there are more and more empirical papers using panel data in economic and management field.At the same time, theoreticalresultsonhowtoprocesspaneldataarealsoincreasing.Howev-e,roneproblemisthatmosttheoreticalmethodologiesonpaneldataarebasedoninfinitesample, but we can only get limited samples in reality; another problem is that existing papers on using panel data don't dospecial treatment for panel data sample or don' t explain why adopting their processing methodology. Therefore, the two contributions of this paper are as follows:1)this paper compares the applicability of existing theoretical method ologiesby simulating based on the three different data structures— that with individual effect, with time effect and with two effects simultaneously; 2)considering that estimation results have significant differences for various processing methods in small sampl,e this paper provide sacriterion for judging what effects exist in the actual data.