• Volume 16,Issue 11,2013 Table of Contents
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    • The effects of inventory game on the performance of assembly system

      2013, 16(11):1-13.

      Abstract (164) HTML (0) PDF 283.27 K (742) Comment (0) Favorites

      Abstract:Considering the importance of supply management to assembly system,we model inventory games between suppliers in the setting of VMI policy and cost-sharing. This paper seeks to shed light on the impacts of such games on the less inventory and profit allocation in decentralized systems with information-isolating and information-sharing. The centralized system is demonstrated for comparison.Further,two strategies are presented for system performance improving. Our results show that: 1) In the case of information-isolating,the inaccurate guesses for less-inventory holder between the suppliers can lead to wrong decision making,thus damaging the expected profit of gamers.The degree of this damage relates to the suppliers’confidence.2) With the existence of Nash equilibrium guaranteed,information sharing and the modulation of the cost-sharing ratio can help improve the entire performance.This conclusion illustrates the possibility of information sharing between suppliers.3) If the penalty of the ordering delay is high,the inventory of two parts should be equal, otherwise,the inventory of two parts should be unequal.Hence,whether a decentralized system should be altered for symmetric system or unsymmetric system depends.

    • Impact of information flow on returns and return volatility in Chinese stock market

      2013, 16(11):1-12.

      Abstract (188) HTML (0) PDF 272.99 K (691) Comment (0) Favorites

      Abstract:This paper constructed,based on the value function theory,a econometric model which can explain the impact of information flow on stock market return and return volatility. Then we applied the Shangzheng Index and Shenzheng Index to our empirical analysis. The empirical results show that the value function form can explain well the impact of information flow on return. Information flow and the investor’s behavior bias,which is described by value function,can explain the return volatility and its persistence feature in the Chinese stock market. Furthermore,investors’loss aversion behavior can give a good explanation to the asymmetric impacts of good information and bad information on the stock market return and its volatility. Meanwhile,the empirical research reveals that the graph of the value function displays a reverse S-shaped in Chinese stock market.

    • Two-product newsboy problem based on prospect theory

      2013, 16(11):1-13.

      Abstract (203) HTML (0) PDF 616.67 K (783) Comment (0) Favorites

      Abstract:Applying the prospect theory to analyzing the ordering model of two products under random demand is a new research approach. Based on the framework of prospect theory,this article analyzes the value function,subjective probability and decision weighting function while considering two products under random demand,and then the ordering model is established.This model considers two products while existing researches only consider a single product.It can be the foundation of researches on multi-production.It makes an important progress in the research of multi-product newsboy problem while using prospect theory.The ordering problem of two products based on prospect theory is analyzed from many different aspects in the numerical example, like the salvage value,the psychological reference points, the risk-attitude coefficients and so on.he results show that this model can be used to better describe the retailers’actual ordering behavior.

    • An approach for the minimum cost problem of projects under generalized precedence relations ( GPRs)

      2013, 16(11):1-13.

      Abstract (172) HTML (0) PDF 777.62 K (690) Comment (0) Favorites

      Abstract:For project scheduling,when solving a cost problem,such as the time-cost tradeoff problem,we need to obtain the minimum cost of the project as a starting point of the optimization process. If only a single precedence relation exists between activities, we can obtain the minimum cost of a project by letting all activities choose their minimum cost durations.If generalized precedence relations (GPRs) exist between activities,letting all activities choose their minimum cost durations may not meet the given precedence relations and result in a unfeasible project. Aiming at the minimum cost problem of projects under GPRs,we found a mathematical model,and then transform it into an equivalent and special minimum cost maximum flow model by using primal-dual theory. Thus,we can calculate the optimal solution of the special minimum cost maximum flow model by using a current algorithm,and then obtain the minimum cost of a project under GPRs based on the primal-dual relation.

    • Is economic performance important for Chinese official promotion?

      2013, 16(11):1-14.

      Abstract (238) HTML (0) PDF 273.30 K (977) Comment (0) Favorites

      Abstract:Official promotion incentives have been playing a vital role in Chinese economic development.This paper focuses on not only the effects of economic factors,non-economic factors and individual characteristics on the likelihood of promotion of local officials,but also the differences of relative importance of these factors across provincial top leaders and vice leaders. Using a turnover dataset of provincial top leaders and vice leaders of 31 provinces between 1978 and 2008,this paper argues that economic performances have a stronger impact on the likelihood of promotion of provincial vice leaders than that of top leaders,for which non-economic factors is more important.The empirical evidence shows that China has made greater progresses in the democratization of personnel control of junior officers than in that of senior officers since the reform and opening-up.

    • Forecasting ability of overnight information on daytime trading in Chinese commodity futures markets

      2013, 16(11):1-14.

      Abstract (204) HTML (0) PDF 389.36 K (795) Comment (0) Favorites

      Abstract:To investigate the predictive ability of overnight information on daytime trading in Chinese commodity futures market,this paper gives the stochastic volatility models based on normal,student-t,generalized error and the mixture of normal distributions respectively.Then,using Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) estimation techniques,the empirical analyses are given for copper,aluminum,soybean and wheat futures markets. The results show that the stochastic volatility models with the mixture of normal distributions can better fit the stochastic volatility with normal,student-t,generalized error distributions in describing the impact of overnight information on daytime trading prices.Total overnight information shows significant predictive ability for daytime returns and volatility.Moreover,the aspects and degrees of prediction are different for different futures contracts.Furthermore,weeknight returns,weekend returns and medium-long holiday returns show prominent predictive abilities for daytime returns and volatility.Their predictive abilities are evidently stronger than those of the total overnight information,and show different degrees of asymmetry Concretely,there are leverage effects for the impact of overnight information during the weeknights,weekends and medium-long holidays on the daytime returns and volatility in most futures contracts,except for inverse leverage effects of medium-long holiday in both soybean and wheat futures contracts.

    • Self-control,addiction and optimal pricing: Theory and evidence

      2013, 16(11):1-16.

      Abstract (178) HTML (0) PDF 304.84 K (887) Comment (0) Favorites

      Abstract:Consumers with self-control problems often more easily develop harmful addictions to an addictive good,which will motivate firms to set its prices by taking advantage of such addictions.Hence,based on the addiction model of O’Donoghue and Rabin( 1999a,2002) ,this paper explores how a monopolist designs its pricing strategy for the addictive time-inconsistent consumers.We show that,when the initial addiction level is zero for all consumers,the sophisticates more easily develop a life-time addiction than naifs do,so the monopolist sets a higher price for them. In contrast,when the consumers have developed harmful addictions,the monopolist prices more for naifs than sophisticates since the former are tempted by the good to a greater extent.Naturally,rational consumers ( TCs) are priced the lowest.The main settings and conclusions of our theory qualitatively match the empirical evidences from Chinese online game industry.

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