Abstract:This paper investigates the effect of CEO openness on organizational strategy persistence．Results from the data of listed companies in China from 2003 to 2009 show that CEO openness has significantly negative effect on strategy persistence．As the level of CEO openness gets higher，the organization tend to adjust the strategic resource allocation according to environmental changing．Moreover，the result indicates that this relationship is moderated by CEO shareholding negatively，and the negative effect of CEO openness on strategic persistence is much stronger when open a CEO has more managerial discretion．The result also finds that the effect of CEO openness on strategy persistence is heterogeneous in different organization-institutional situations，because of the influence of special institution characteristics and certain social functions; the negative effect of CEO openness is much less significant for State-Owned Enterprises relative to family firms．This paper further extends the knowledge about the effect of strategy persistence on firm value: strategy persistence has an inverted-U-shaped rather than a linear relationship with firm performance．

Abstract:Based on chain-to-chain price competition model which was defined by two manufacturers and two exclusive retailers under demand uncertainty and vertical restraints，this paper not only identified the market conditions of performance improvement equilibriums for supply chain’s members when the manufacturer adopted the contract of the retailer’s fixed markup，but also investigated the impact of demand risk，market size，market share，price competition，demand forecast ability and markup ratio on the performance improvement equilibriums．The results show that: when price competition between the two competing supply chains is weaker relatively and market share is bigger relatively，the retailer’s fixed markup will improve the whole supply chain’s performance and produce a dominant equilibrium and Bayesian equilibrium for the whole supply chain; what is more，if the markup ratio is relatively modest and the demand risk is not very high，or the markup ratio is bigger relatively and the demand risk is relatively modest at the same time，the retailer’s fixed markup will realize a dominant equilibrium and Bayesian equilibrium for both the manufacturer and retailer．However，when price competition is very fierce，the wholesale price contract will produce a dominant equilibrium and Bayesian equilibrium for the whole supply chain．

Abstract:This paper considers congestion road pricing with demand uncertainty，and uses the mean-excess total travel time as the system risk measure．Mean-excess total travel time can consider both the reliability and the unreliability of total travel time，and so it is a more complete risk measure．Because the model in this paper with stochastic demand is difficult to solve，we turn it to a deterministic model through Monte Carlo simulation，and solve it with the genetic algorithm．A numerical example is presented to illustrate the model and compare it with the expected value model．It shows our model is more appropriate for risk-aversion deciders．At last，we demonstrate the stability of the algorithm through examining the effect of the parameters to the solution．

Abstract:Knowledge rigidities in firms make them stick to existing knowledge and impede the inflow of new external knowledge．This paper explores knowledge transfer behaviors among the cluster firms from a firm’s knowledge rigidity perspective，which helps investigate the factors inducing knowledge lock-in and path dependency in industrial clusters．To conduct a simulation of knowledge transfer behaviors in cluster networks with small-world characteristics，state variables，such as firm’s knowledge rigidity，knowledge absorptive capacity and so on，are defined．Knowledge rigidity impact rule，shortest path rule and knowledge transfer rule are also designed．The simulation data and analysis results show that the firms’knowledge rigidities influence the knowledge transfers in clusters significantly．Controlling cluster firms’knowledge rigidities and building diversified learning and cooperation relationships in different channels can expand the scope of the knowledge transfer and improve its effectiveness．These are effective solutions to ease the knowledge lock-in and path dependence in industry clusters．

Abstract:Reverse auctions are widely used for centralized procurements in large enterprises and government department．The bid evaluation mechanism is a key factor for a fair auction and resource allocation． The current bid evaluation process is usually done by two groups，a business and a technical expert group，respectively．When human factors are taken into consideration，the antagonistic feelings and noncooperation behaviors between groups inevitable preveal． Firstly，the paper constructs a noncooperative game model based on grouped bid evaluation behaviors in order to analyze the conditions for achieving a long-term cooperative equilibrium between groups，meanwhile，it obtains the replicator dynamics equations about the technical-business experts game． Secondly，it analyzes the evolution paths and the factors influencing the bidding evaluation behaviors based on the evolutionary game．We also describe the effect of individuals’choice of policy on group behaviors．Third，to maximize the clarity on these bid evaluation behaviors，we develop a simulation system based on the evolution process and run it several times on a Matlab GUI platform，which is convenient for adjusting relevant parameters．The simulation results prove the effects of decision-making parameters as well as start-up variants on initial conditions that determine further ( possible) evolutions．The methods and results presented in this paper can enhance the decision-making support of administrative departments in their bid evaluations of procurements in order to guide the referee experts’behaviors into the desired channels to achieve optimal outcomes，so that a more judicious bidding evaluation process may result．

Abstract:Based on the VAR model，we modify MRR model ( Madhavan et al． 1997) by extending the expectation formula which measures the next trade sign．We argue that MRR model overestimates the information risk as the expectation formula in MRR model could not capture the full information．We present a VAR structure to replace the one period expectation formula in MRR model and give a new model ( VAR-MRR) ．Using the high frequency data of the 50 stocks of the SSE 50 index of 2004，we estimate and test the information risks of MRR and VAR-MRR．The results show that MRR overestimates the information risk，and the incomplete information capturing results in inaccurate estimations in MRR．Further，the results show that the liquidity cost dominated the information risk． Shanghai Stock Exchange exhibit U-shape intraday patterns for the information risk and the liquidity cost．

Abstract:Based on 1 minute high-frequency data，this paper analyzed intraday effect of CSI300 index futures for the first time and found“LM”pattern of absolute yields，“WV”pattern of volume，“inverted U”pattern of position，“LM”pattern of basis between highest and lowest price within 1 minute，and“high in the morning，low in the afternoon”pattern of mispricing ratio．Then，dynamic correlation of these five indicators was analyzed by vector auto regression model of variance decomposition and impulse response function．In addition， we designed arbitrage strategy based on mispricing ratio’s intraday effect，and intrasample and outsample result shows the intraday arbitrage strategy is effective．Finally，we made investment recommendations based on result．

Abstract:This paper constructs a theoretical model to prove that stock market cycle，investment style and the quality of risk assets exert an interactive influence on the relationship between the winners‘or losers’performance ranking and risk adjustment．In a bull market，high-quality-asset-holding loserswith lower rankings make greater risk adjustments，and high-quality-asset-holding winners with higher ranking-make less risk adjustments．In a bear market，conservative-high-quality-asset-holding loserswith lower rankingsmake less risk adjustments，and conservative-high-quality-asset-holding winners with higher rankings make greater risk adjustments．The empirical test of the theoretical model inference by using a sample of open-ended funds during 2005 － 20 shows supportive evidence．Risk adjustments of winners or losers have remarkable economic consequences．Losers have significant improvements on performance ranking while winners show substantial decline at the end of the year．It is also proved that the performance of losers with lower rankings improves more， and the performance of winners with higher rankings drops more．