• Volume 18,Issue 10,2015 Table of Contents
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    • The correlation of two-sided exchange rate volatilities and transmission of exchange rate risk in supply chains

      2015, 18(10):1-13.

      Abstract (213) HTML (0) PDF 2.06 M (2212) Comment (0) Favorites

      Abstract:In this paper,we build a supply chain game model consisting of a supplier,a manufacturer and a retailer under a wholesale price contract,where the manufacturer as the focal firm is faced with two-sided ( import and export) exchange rate volatilities. With the model equilibrium,we employ the comparative static analysis to study the impacts of those two-sided exchange rate volatilities and their correlation on the variances of the supply chain members’operations decisions,on their expected profits and on the corresponding variances,and explore the factors that affect the relative levels of risk bearing among these three supply chain members. The results show that: (1) When those two-sided exchange rate volatilities are negatively correlated,the variances of the supply chain members’operations decisions,their expected profits and the corresponding variances increase with the import (export) exchange rate volatility; When those two-sided exchange rate volatilities are positively correlated,there exists a critical level of the import (export) exchange rate volatility such that the variances of the supply chain members’operations decisions,their expected profits and the corresponding variances decrease for lower levels of volatility and increase for higher levels,implying a Ushaped risk transmission; (2) The relative levels of risk bearing among these three supply chain members depend on their decision-making flexibility,but are independent of the correlation of two-sided exchange rate volatilities.

    • Research on combinations of closed-loop supply chain dominant mode and logistics mode

      2015, 18(10):14-25.

      Abstract (329) HTML (0) PDF 1.06 M (2131) Comment (0) Favorites

      Abstract:Two types of supply chain dominant mode—manufacturer dominant and retailer dominant—were constructed,and two types of logistics mode—logistics outsourcing and self-logistics—were given. Enterprise decision making and supply chain stability are studied under four combinations: manufacturer dominant and logistics outsourcing,manufacturer dominant and self-logistics,retailer dominant and logistics outsourcing,and retailer dominant and self-logistics. It is found that: ( 1) The manufacturer’s and the retailer’s logistics strategies are related to the size of T /`T: if 1 < T /`T <√2,then the manufacturer’s and retailer’s logistics strategies are both self-logistics,supply chain is stable; if T /`T > 2,then the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s logistics strategy are both logistics outsourcing,and the supply chain is stable; if√2 < T /`T < 2,then the manufacturer's logistics strategy is inconsistent with the retailer’s,with the manufacturer's optimal logistics strategy being logistics outsourcing ( self-logistics) ,but the retailer’s being self-logistics ( logistics outsourcing) if the manufacturer ( retailer) is the dominant enterprise. ( 2) For the four combinations,if 1 < T /`T < √(12 /5),then the manufacturer dominant and self-logistics( retailer dominant and self-logistics) mode is better than the manufacturer dominant and logistics outsourcing ( retailer dominant and logistics outsourcing) mode. If T /`T > √(12 /5),then the manufacturer dominant and logistics outsourcing ( retailer dominant and logistics outsourcing) mode is better than the manufacturer dominant and self-logistics ( retailer dominant and self-logistics) mode.

    • The cost-effective path of energy mix evolution for China under the emissions budgets

      2015, 18(10):26-37.

      Abstract (265) HTML (0) PDF 1.76 M (2003) Comment (0) Favorites

      Abstract:This paper introduces the indices of herding behavior and market volatility based on multifractal spectrum. Employing the nonlinear Granger causality test proposed by Diks and Panchenko and the cross-correlation coefficient proposed by Zebende,we investigate the dynamic linkages between herding behavior and market volatility. The empirical results indicate that the relationship between herding behavior and market volatility in the Shenzhen stock market is nonlinear,rather than the simple linear linkage. The correlations and causality relationships between herding behavior and market volatility are largely different between before and after the recent financial crisis. Specifically,before the reform of the shareholders in 2005,herding behavior and market volatility could not affect each other. During the period of 2005 - 2007,herding behavior had positive effects on market volatility. However,after 2008,herding behavior had negative effects on market volatility,meanwhile market volatility also had negative effects on herding behavior. This new finding indicates that herding behavior does not always result in“positive feedback”effects as claimed in conventional studies and “negative feedback”effects are present sometimes.

    • Procurement contracts design in the presence of process improvement initiated by the supplier

      2015, 18(10):38-55.

      Abstract (247) HTML (0) PDF 1.08 M (1426) Comment (0) Favorites

      Abstract:Supply risk mitigation is one of the primary concerns of the manufacturer. We consider a manufacturer facing an unreliable supplier with private information on high or low initial reliability,and the initial reliability can be enhanced through process improvement initiated by the supplier. In the presence of such endogenous disruption risk,we utilize the principle-agent theory to analyze how the manufacturer designs the procurement contracts and motivates the supplier’s process improvement to reduce the likelihood of supply disruption.We derive and compare the optimal decisions of both the manufacturer and the supplier under full and asymmetric information. The results show that,information asymmetry with hidden action does not necessarily decrease the supply chain’s profit or generate information rent,and the manufacturer could optimize the procurement contracts under asymmetric information by balancing the trade-off between the information rent and the loss of the supply chain’s profit. When the initial reliabilities and the supplier’s bargaining power satisfy several conditions,the supplier will reveal the private information voluntarily and share the supply chain’s profit with the manufacturer. The conclusions in this paper are valuable and significant to the procurement activities in the presence of supply risk.

    • Models and their experiments of supply chain contracts based on CVaR

      2015, 18(10):56-68.

      Abstract (276) HTML (0) PDF 1.05 M (1998) Comment (0) Favorites

      Abstract:More and more literatures are studying supply chain contracts with risk preferences,but experimental researches still focus on the test of supply chain contracts under the assumption of risk-neutral theory.Few literatures are found to study the contract models under risk preferences combined with experimental studies. In order to provide appropriate decision support tools for retailers with different risk preferences,CVaR,one of the most popular financial risk management tools,is applied to form the retailer’s optimal ordering models based on the wholesale contract and revenue-sharing contract. Experiments are used to test the models. It is found that the regression equations based on CVaR models can fit the experimental data very well. The retailer’s risk-aversion or risk-taking characteristics are significant,and CVaR can significantly reduce the deviation,and help the decision-maker decrease the volatility of the orders,which also confirms the models’practical value.

    • Is underdiversification caused by superior information or psychological bias: The theoretical explanation and empirical test based on information allocation

      2015, 18(10):69-79.

      Abstract (214) HTML (0) PDF 381.59 K (1345) Comment (0) Favorites

      Abstract:This paper examines the portfolio selection problem when investors should pay for information acquisition and have psychological bias. We propose a model to analysis the interaction between information choice and investment choice,and find that the investor’s optimal information acquisition strategy is using all the information to learn about the asset with the highest Sharpe ratio,which induce an under-diversification portfolio.The model also shows the psychological bias will cause an under-diversification portfolio. We use all mutual fund trade data between 2002 and 2007 in Shenzhen Stock Exchange to examine our hypothesis. The empirical evidence supports the hypothesis of asymmetric information hypothesis. Under-diversification portfolio is caused by superior information of mutual funds in Chinese Stock Markets.

    • Organizational support,perceived status and employees’innovative behavior: Perspective of employment diversity

      2015, 18(10):80-94.

      Abstract (361) HTML (0) PDF 839.87 K (2951) Comment (0) Favorites

      Abstract:Based on the theories of social comparison and social exchange,this study explores how organizational support and employment identity diversity affect employee innovative behavior through perceived insider status. The results show that perceived insider status mediates the relationship between organizational support and employee innovative behavior and employment identity diversity moderates not only the linkage of organizational support and perceived insider status but also the linkage of perceived insider status and employee innovative behavior negatively,which contribute to theory and practice by throwing a new light upon such issue as “why more organizational supports cannot drive more employee innovative behaviors”and making clear how organizational support and employee relationship management can drive employees’innovative behavior and improve organizational effectiveness.

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