Abstract:With the introduction of habit formation，we develop a general consumption-based asset pricing model to capture the higher moments of the shocks in the capital markets． The calibration results show that our model can explain the risk premium puzzle and the risk-free rate puzzle with more flexible risk aversion coefficient，and can effectively reduce the sensitivity of the parameters selection problem for the rare disaster model． Also，habit formation factors can significantly improve the effect of asset prices higher moments of approximation，and weaken the influence of higher moments information ( more than four moments) on asset pricing． Finally，we check the applicability of the model in China’s financial market． The study find that disaster pricing model can also explain China’s equity premium，and that the habit formation factors can improve the model’s explanatory power for China’s financial market．

Abstract:VAT reform across the country in 2009 provides us an opportunity to test whether firms with different property characteristics behave differently on labor demand． Our research finds that，generally，the capital-labor substitution effect is greater than the income effect，and there is an overall decline in corporate labor demand． Meanwhile，private enterprises experience a strong decline in labor demand while state-owned enterprises’labor demand has not been reduced due to the presence of soft budget constraints，therefore，stateowned enterprises are less sensitive to the reform than private enterprises and the difference is statistically significant．In addition，central SOEs significantly reduce labor demand，while the demand of the local SOEs have not been reduced due to the intervention of local governments，so local SOEs are less sensitive to the reform compared to central SOEs． Furthermore，since state-owned enterprises，especially local SOEs，satisfy more labor demand，they have received more government subsidies in return．

Abstract:In this paper，the bi-levl programming model is proposed to study the continuous network design problem with the second-best credits charging under elastic demand． The upper level decision maker maximizes the total social benefits by choosing the link enhancement and link credit charging． The lower level decision makers ( the users) choose their optimal paths to minimize their generalized travel costs including the travel time and the value of credit for using the credit-charging link． By replacing the lower level programming problem with its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker( KKT) conditions，the bi-level programming model can be transformed into a single level problem． To deal with the difficult slackness conditions in the above single level problem，we propose a relaxation algorithm to solve it． Numerical experiments demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed model and algorithm． The numerical results show that this proposed model can obtain better effects to alleviate the congestion． It will be convenient and feasible to implement if we improve the link enhancement and charge the credit only in the subset of the network． In this proposed model，the users who travel more should buy the credits from the market and pay money for those additional travel need． While the users who reduce their travel can sell their extra credits to compensate their inconvenience for reducing travel． Thus，this tradable credit scheme is revenue neutral．

Abstract:The risk identification of unconventional crisis is one of the core scientific problems of the emergency management． Due to the current situation of frequently facing a baseless simulation in academic study and practical application，risk identification has become a difficult issue that needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency． By integrating immunology theory，complex adaptive system theory and the computational experiment，this paper proposes a theory for the evolution from the antibody of risk recognizer into the antigen of unconventional crisis，and builds a standard system and a model for identification of the affinity of risk identification，the cleanup effect of antigen，the amount and energy of the risk recognizers and so on． It adopts a research idea of identifying sub-unconventional crisis and the syntagmatic relation among various events and its emergency to understand the unconventional crisis infinitely． By computational experiments and illustrative examples，the feasibility is uerified．

Abstract:The strategies of venture capitalist and entrepreneurs in the venture capital market may form an exit dilemma， therefore，the analysis of their strategy selection and entanglement using quantum game is given． The results show that there is a critical condition，and that the Nash equilibrium of the quantum game will be completely different when the entanglement that the two party setect the same strategy varies． The condition of a successful exit is that the entanglement that they two select the same strategy is greater than that they select different strategies，and the specific equilibrium depends on the entanglement in the initial quantum state．

Abstract:To relieve the serious utilization imbalance of medical resource in the community hospital referral system in China，this paper studies the service capacity design and its pricing via an integrated model of the queuing and game theory． The behavior of delay-sensitive patients is first captured，followed by a competition equilibrium between a profit-oriented class 3-A hospital and a community hospital，whose goal is to serve more patients． We show that the optimal service capacity of community hospital is increasing in the government’s subsidy，while the price of class 3-A hospital is decreasing if the subsidy is sufficiently large． Our result also shows that the subsidy policy is an effective coordination mechanism to relieve the mentioned imbalance

Abstract:Information disclosure is an important means of market discipline． However，that disclosure can play the role of market discipline need investors pay attention to banks’risk taking behavior． In China，there exists a partially implicit insurance system． Unde this system，the attetion paid to banks’risk taking behaviors by investors varies with to the support that banks received from the government． We establish a game model to analyze the interaction mechanism between banks’risk-taking behaviors and disclosure under partially implicit insurance． We find that banks which are not surely rescued by government tend to choose the sound risk-taking strategy． Besides，under implicit deposit insurance system，banks tend to take excessive risk and the implicit deposit insurance may weaken the market constraint effect of disclosure． This paper uses empirical analysis to prove the relevant conclusions，and put forwards corresponding policy recommendations．

Abstract:For the“highly underpriced Chinese IPO puzzle”，we propose Sai-GA-SVＲ method to judge whether the new issues are underpriced or overpriced from market characteristics． We analyze the IPO market characteristics under different policies in China，and the empirical results suggest that pricing regulations are the major cause of the underpricing，while the following reform brings severe IPO bubbles to the A-share market．Though the book-building system has alleviated the severity of underpricing，the overwhelming superiority of the institutional investors compels the private investors to speculate from hot issues，as a result of ineffective rent allocation．