Abstract:The continuous innovation serves as the engine of an enterprise and the product rollover strategy is critical when a firm sequentially launches new products． As frequent product introductions are common in many industries，consumers become more and more sophisticated when choosing the purchase time based on their anticipation of future options． In a two-period-game model，we characterize the rational expectations equilibrium，where we show the market segmentations，the firm’s optimal pricing，and rollover strategy． When the market size is stable over two periods，pricing penetration with dual rollover strategy is more appealing than pricing skimming with single rollover under slower technical obsolescence and larger proportion of high-end consumers． A potential growth of the market size in the second period would make the firm more profitable in the first period with pricing penetration because i) a higher price can be set in the first period and ii) the consumers’strategic waiting can be mitigated due to the possibility of a single rollover strategy．

Abstract:Ｒelative to the wide application of online group buying in practice，there has been scant academic research． This paper is devoted to fill this gap by investigating the decisions on pricing and timing in online group buying market． Based on the degree of consumers’heterogeneity and time-sensitivity，we first subdivide the market and then examine the optimal strategies individually． Our results show that: 1) In the maximizing the seller’s revenue，pricing and timing decisions always exhibit some functional relationship． However，this relationship varies according to different market characteristics． 2) The principal of timing decision is to guarantee the purchase of every consumer in each segmented market． 3) Contrast to the unique optimal strategy in time-sensitive market，there have been two optimal strategies in the heterogeneous market，i． e． ，low pricing and high pricing． Which strategy should be adopted depends on the specific characteristics of the heterogeneous market． Finally，we conclude and present the selection process of the optimal strategy in the online group buying market．

Abstract:Ｒeverse multi-attribute auction is increasingly becoming one main mechanism for e-procurement．Bidding strategies and auction revenue are key concerns of the auction participants． In this paper，sellers’bidding strategies and the expected revenue of the sellers and the buyers are given respectively for two typical reverse multi-attribute auction mechanisms: reverse multi-attribute English auction and reverse multi-attribute first-score sealed auction． The above results can provide decision support for auction participants． One important theorem of this paper is that auction expected revenue is equal among the above both typical reverse multiattribute auction mechanisms，multi-attribute second-score sealed-bid auction and multi-attribute Dutch auction．This conclusion is a further expansion of the expected revenue equivalence theorem in the field of multiattribute auction．

Abstract:Technique intensive innovation is a very important measure for a company to gain advantage in competition．With consideration of the importance of internally production cost and externally innovation allowance method，this paper assumes that different companies’products are substitutable and have different products costs． We discussed two kinds of companies—one with cost advantage，the other with cost disadvantage—and government’s two allowance methods—allowance on innovation investment and allowance on product innovation project． We analyzed how the two kinds of government’s allowance method influence the companies’choice of their innovation model． The result from our analysis and numerical simulation shows that if the government is in a low level of allowance on innovation investment or product innovation project，the two kinds of the companies，either in cost advantage or in cost disadvantage，will tend to evolve into the model of gradually innovation and the allowance in product innovation takes a great effect on its evolutionary speed． If the government is in a high level of allowance on innovation invest ment or product innovation project，the influence from such two allowance methods are different for the two kinds of companies’innovation model choice; the allowance on innovation investment pushes the two kinds of companies to breakthrough their innovation model，but the allowance on product innovation project shows little effect in guiding companies selecting the breakthrough innovation model． When the allowance on product innovation project is in a high level，the two kinds of companies evolve slowly into the gradual innovation model． Enlarging the scale of the allowance amount，refining the structure of innovation allowance，and setting up a long team innovation mechanism all enables the innovation allowance to become an effective away of motivation on innovation．

Abstract:Both bidders’potential market power and multiple equilibrium in auction games are important problems in designing auctions for divisible goods． This paper puts the two problems above into one uniform framework to investigate the auction design in divisible goods market． We capture the market power of the large bidder by introducing uncertainty in the residual supply of the buyers when bidding，refine the potential continuum multiple equilibrium，and then obtain the unique and symmetrical linear equilibrium bidding functions based on the uniform price，discriminatory price and Vickrey auction formats，respectively． We rank these three formats in terms of the criteria employed in the practical design of the markets for divisible goods，such as expected revenue，stabilizing prices，and encouraging bidder participation． The main conclusions are:First，the expected revenue under the discriminatory price auction is more than that under the Vickrey auction，which is more than that under the uniform price auction，but all three auctions would not obtain total market surplus; Second，the discriminatory price auction gives rise to the lowest stop-out price volatility，the equilibrium price based on the Vickrey auction has a higher volatility，and the price volatility under the uniform price auction is the highest among the three formats; Third，the uniform price auction would encourage more entries than other auctions，the Vickrey auction encourages less，and participation under the discriminatory price auction is the least，but all three formats would encourage more entries than Pareto efficient market size． Our model accommodates both small and large markets，as well as different risk preferences of the sellers．The results have important implications for the auctioneers designing the auction format according to different objectives．

Abstract:Considering a short-life-cycle product supply chain consisting of one supplier and two retailers，in which the demand faced by the two retailers is independent and product transshipment between the two retailers is allowed． The ordering decision models with transshipment and without transshipment between the retailers，as well as with the market satisfaction rate constraint and without market satisfaction rate constraint are developed，respectively． The solutions for transshipment policy and non-transshipment policy are derived accordingly．It can be shown that，whether the market satisfaction rate constraint is considered or not，if unit product transshipment cost is not greater than a specific value，the retailers’order quantity and expected total cost resulted from the transshipment policy is not greater than that from non-transshipment policy． At last，a numerical example is given to demonstrate the effect of emergency transshipment policy and analyze the impact of market satisfaction rate and unit transshipment cost on the transshipment policy． Some helpful managerial insights are drawn．

Abstract:This article investigates the time-varying price-volume relationship and the impact of short-sell shocks on the price-volume relationship by utilizing the TVP-VAＲ-GCK Model of Koop et al．( 2009) ． The most probable variables order in the VAＲ model and the impulsive function are selected by employing the VAＲ_BE model and varimin criteria． The results reveal that the price-volume relationship is significantly time-varying and different samples ( both indices and individual stocks) have distinct patterns． The results also suggest that the market structural change has a time-varying impact on the price-volume relationship． The results are consistent with the behavior finance theory on the price-volume relationship，which reflects the learning process of investors in response to the structure changes in the stock exchanges in China．

Abstract:We specify attentive and inattentive investors in a two period model with a single risky asset． In the market-clearing equilibrium，we find that the more attention investors pay to the relevant information，the lower the risk premium they obtain． We divide the attentive investors into two categories: the investors who are attentive information and those who are attentive to noise，then，we find that the proportion of investors who are attentive to noise plays a vital role in determining the relationship between the attention level and the risk premium．Given more attention paid to the noisy information，the increase in the number of attentive investors tends to raise the risk premium，but the effect turns negative when less attention is paid to the noisy information．We call this“attention classifying hypothesis”． After introducing inattentive investors with rational expectation，we obtain the similar conclusions．