Abstract:To study the decision process when decision makers have different risk preferences，a dynamic strategy，which classifies decision makers while approaching the solution，is proposed． First，effective attributes based on the similarity relationship of attribute values are extracted and weights are assigned to them objectively．Second，decision makers’type of risk preferences (risk aversion，risk neutral，risk seeking) are converged into step by step according to the decision activities． According to the possibility and similarity of the interval numbers，the prospect theory models are established． Then，a suitable theoretical model is selected in the process of information aggregation and ranking according to decision makers’risk preferences． Moreover，in order to maximize the fairness of the decision result，we propose a new information fusion algorithm is proposed when different types of decision makers exist at the same time． Finally，the new approach is validated via realistic examples．

Abstract:Analyzing the status of team development can help to evaluate team current state and development process and provide necessary decision supports for team building． This paper，from the perspective of knowledge，shows that transactive memory system ( TMS) can be used as a team knowledge representation，and proposes a method to analyse team development based on TMS． Firstly，according to a member’s knowledge structure，especially differentiated knowledge in his transactive memory，a member’s transactive memory-differentiated knowledge model (TM _ DKM) is proposed． Secondly，a transactive memory system model (TMSM) is proposed by integrating all members’differentiated knowledge． Then，an analytical method of team development status based on TM_DKM and TMSM is put forward． Finally，a case study is given to validate our model and method． Our method can be used to study innovation teams including their state and development process evaluations as well as problem diagnosis，such as innovative teams in the ministry of education，national innovative groups，and so on．

Abstract:Determining the weights of evaluators is an important step in evaluation methods． This paper proposes a new method to determine an evaluator’s weight based on network game，and detailed discussions and validations of the solution and parameters are given． This paper considers evaluators as network nodes，and the evaluations as the links between the evaluators，which make up the edges of the network． Based on the evaluators’rating information，this paper defines the“Cooperation”and“Confliction”matrix between the evaluators as the weight matrix of the network． A network game model is established and the optimal solution is solved as the weight values． It is proved that the optimal solution is a Nash interior equilibrium solution and the only Nash equilibrium solution of this problem． Furthermore，this paper analyzes the relationship between the optimal solution and network-centricity measure，and the meaning of optimal solution in network science; namely，this paper linkes up the knowledge of decision-making theory and network science． Through mathematical proofs and simulation analyses，this paper reveals the meaning of the parameters in the model，which determine two excellent properties of the solution: “isotonicity”and“stability”． Accordingly，this paper proposes an approach on parameter selection based on the features of the data set，and applies the model in a real data set． In conclusion，the weight allocation method is practical，and it could balance the two good properties of the solutions．

Abstract:Considering the characteristics of construction projects，a multi-task incentive model between the owner and contractor was established based on the principal-agent theory． An extended form of Cobb-Douglas production function was built to reflect the outcome of construction projects in the circumstances of multi-dimensional efforts invested in schedule，cost and quality． Ｒesults indicate that the optimal amount of effort devoted to each of the three tasks is positively associated with the total factor productivity，and negatively associated with the marginal changing rate of cost-of-effort． Besides，the optimal incentive coefficient is influenced by two kinds of factors: one is related to the contractor，including the total factor productivity，absolute risk-aversion coefficient，and the marginal changing rate of cost-of-effort; the other is related to the significance of each task and the uncertainty of the circumstances． Our research results could help the owner select appropriate incentive intensity and achieve reasonable risk sharings．

Abstract:Increased consumer preference for low carbon products provides many business opportunities; investment in reducing carbon emissions results in positive externalities in supply chains． This paper investigates the strategy of promoting investment in reducing carbon emissions for suppliers and manufacturers in a two-echelon supply chain under a contract with punishment mechanism． According to the different payoff matrices of suppliers and manufacturers when adopting different strategies，this paper develops an evolutionary game model，and proposes evolutionary stable strategies of investments in reducing carbon emissions for upstream and downstream firms． The results show that investment strategies of suppliers and manufacturers are related to the ratio of input-output． When the input-output ratios of both parties in supply chains change，some evolutionarily stable equilibrium is found． Finally，a numerical verification for the mathematical model is given． If a‘free rider’can gain a lot in a supply chain，suppliers or manufacturers will not invest in reducing carbon emissions．

Abstract:New ventures need to leverage the internal resources and external networks． From the perspective of new venture growth，this study defines the internal resources as entrepreneurial orientation and innovation capability，and divides the external networks into sponsorship-based and partnership-based． By using 224 listed new ventures in China，we examine the leveraging relationship between internal and external resources． The result illustrates that: The internal resources and sponsorship-based network constitute the strategic substitution effect，while the internal resources and external partnership-based networks constitute the complementary effect． Our research also shows different external networks exert different leveraging effects on internal resources，and implies that new ventures should cultivate the strategic complementary effect，instead of depending on the strategic substitution effect caused by low-cost sponsorship-based networks．

Abstract:In an environment with only one type of financial asset，a multi-period market trading model is pro-posed，which contains three types of participants． This model explores the impacts of the informed trader proportion，expectation precision，nature of information ( good or bad) ，market sentiment，trader initial asset，short-selling constraint and risk attitudes on financial market dynamics． It is found that the change in the proportion of the informed traders and that in the expectation precision are the subjective and objective reasons for market price reversal phenomenon，respectively and that these subjective and objective factors have different effects on the market dynamics． Above all，this paper also provides some theoretical explanations for the phenomena of fluctuation，mean reversion，bubbles of market price，price under reaction，over reactions，and so on．

Abstract:In this paper，the entrepreneur efforts are divided into explicit efforts and implicit efforts． According to the different types of efforts，a principal-agent model with rational venture investment is established．The fairness preference of behavioral economics is embedded into the venture investment’s incentive model，which is studied in different situations． Ｒesults showed that: If the venture entrepreneur has explicit efforts，the fairness preference coefficient will have no influence on the incentive coefficient，the venture entrepreneur’s effort level and venture capitalist’s effort level． If the venture entrepreneur’s efforts are implicit，the venture capitalists should share the project income with the venture entrepreneur ( the venture entrepreneur’s incentive coefficient is greater than 0) ． Moreover，if the venture entrepreneur has fairness preferences，the project’s revenue sharing coefficient is greater than the project profit’s sharing coefficient; the venture entrepreneur and venture capitalists will both reduce the effort level; however，the venture entrepreneur’s actual profits are the highest． At the same time，the larger the venture entrepreneur’s fairness preference jealousy coefficient is，the more the actual profits are obtained． But the actual profit of the venture capitalists is negatively related to the fairness preference jealousy coefficient． Finally，with a simulation，the results of theoretical solution are further tested and analyzed，and the same conclusions are reached．

Abstract:Academic journal evaluation is one of the important issues in journal research field． Traditional methods of data envelopment analysis are based on self-evaluation when evaluating the performance of academic journals． Without peer-evaluation，the evaluation result might be easily exaggerated． This paper studies the problem under the non-cooperative game framework by using data envelopment analysis /assurance region ( DEA/AＲ) game cross efficiency method，and 17 Chinese sci-tech core journals are selected as an illustrative example． The results show that: 1) Some academic journals with high industry influence have non-ideal evaluation results: although their outputs are ideal，their published papers are non-ideal． 2) The evaluation values of academic journals could be increasing，unchanged，decreasing with the change of the preference of index weights． 3) The self-citeing of journals have three cases: excessive，moderate and insufficient． The evaluation result can provide a powerful decision reference for journal assistants to improve the competitiveness of journals．