Abstract:By explicitly considering the dynamic nature of capital structure，this paper re-examines the rela-tionship between leverage and cross-section expected returns in both China and the U． S． ． Specifically，the paper decomposes leverage into target and relative components and finds that relative leverage better explains expected returns than observed leverage． Fama-MacBeth regression results show that relative leverage is posi-tively and significantly related to equity returns in both these two markets，however，the effect mechanism of relative leverage differs． Specifically，compared with the U． S． ，over-leverage tends to affect equity returns more significantly than under-leverage and relative book leverage has a weaker influence in China． Further-more，the portofolio tests using joint iterated GMM procedure show that different asset pricing models with rela-tive leverage factors dominate FF model in China and the U． S． respectively． These findings provide a new perspective to the relationship between financial leverage and equity returns under different institutional envi-ronments．

Abstract:Evidence from the developed capital markets shows that underwriter reputation can be used to re-strain the earning management of IPO companies． This restraining relationship is reexamined with the samples of IPO companies from 2001 to 2011 in China． A different result is found that underwriter reputation is ineffec-tive in restraining the earning management of IPO companies，and that the positive relationship between them is significant under the poor investor protection areas． Moreover，in order to get a higher underwriting fee，the higher-reputed underwriters may even help the IPO companies to gain a larger room in earning management．Obviously，in order for the mechanism of underwriter reputation to work effectively，China’s market needs to be better self-disciplined，and the legal risks needs to be raised against the opportunism behavior of the under-writers especially．

Abstract:The model of Pouget is extended to investigate the impact of order transparency on the efficiency of order-driven markets where there are full of adaptive learning ( limited rational) investors． The results show that both the efficiency of information revealing and welfare allocation will deviate from rational equilibrium when in-vestors can observe the order details of the others in the regime of transparency． The reason is that the informed traders take advantage of their private information and submit non-equilibrium orders which are more beneficial to him． The uninformed traders also abandon the equilibrium strategy and submit more conservative orders to a-void adverse selection risk． Both of the traders’choice substantially reduce the market efficiency．

Abstract:The study empirically investigates the effect and mechanism of inquiry objects’relationship networks on IPO pricing，from the perspective of relationship network of capital market’s subject． The results show that the strength and character of inquiry objects’relationship networks play an important role in IPO pricing through affecting individual inquiry objects’offer behaviors． Specifically，collaboratively low price of inquiry objects is more serious when the relationship between the inquiry objects is stronger; IPO pricing is lower when the relationship between the inquiry objects is stronger; participation of QFII aggravates rather than weakens the effect of relationship between the inquiry objects on behaviors of inquiry objects’collaborative low price and IPO pricing． The study expands researches on relationship networks of capital markets by finding the effect of the strength of the inquiry objects’relationship networks on IPO pricing，as well as provides a theoretical basis for solving‘high pricing’questions in IPO markets through market forces instead of only administrative powers．

Abstract:This paper analyzes the role and economic consequences of financial constraints in real estate price transmission． It is found that real estate prices fluctuations have significant effects on corporate financing and investment，and that the diffuse scope of effects depends on corporate financial constraints: when corporate re-al estate value grows，more financially constrained corporations raise more outside debts，have more investment capability，and then are more inclined to overinvest． This paper also finds that real estate price fluctuations can lower the efficiency of corporate capital allocation，and that there is not substantial performance improve-ment after rising corporate real estate value． These findings indicate that there are negative effects in the trans-mission mechanism of collateral asset prices． It is also found that highly constrained corporations show more in-vestment volatility with real estate price fluctuations，suggesting that financial constraints may amplify business cycles fluctuations which is in consistent with Kiyotaki and Moore( 1997) ．

Abstract:This paper introduces an optimization model ( COSDM) of Container Ocean-transportation System with the objective of maximizing the profit of a liner company，while taking the seasonal changes of transporta-tion demands and choice inertia of shippers into consideration． COSDM can optimize shipping network design and fleet deployment simultaneously． It also optimizes the plans for shipping network adjustment and for dis-trusting slots in ships based on the fluctuant demand and the characteristics of the shippers’chosen inertia． To solve COSDM，a heuristic algorithm ( ACOSP) is put forward by combining Genetic Algorithm and Linear Pro-gramming． The experimental results show that COSDM can give an optimized design of the system in consider-ation of the stability of transporting services． The proposed model also improves the user experiences of the shippers while increasing the profit of the liner company．

Abstract:This study considers fairness’s effect on the pricing decisions in a two-echelon supply chain with one supplier and one retailer． The supplier decides the wholesale price of the single product firstly，and then the retailer decides the selling price after accepting supplier’s contract． Finally，the market demand is real-ized as a linear function of selling price unless the retailer rejects supplier’s contract and then both echelons will receive nothing． Based on the managerial experiment，this study indicates that: ( i) both of the supplier’ s wholesale price and the retailer’s selling price are lower than the theoretical results under perfect rationality assumption; ( ii) specifically，the supplier is altruistic and believes that the retailer selfishly aims at maximi-zing his own profit，however，the retailer is spiteful; ( iii) the coefficient of variability of the wholesale price is larger than that of the selling price． The managerial insights are that in the two-echelon supply chain，the sup-plier should adjust his belief on retailer’s fairness concern as being spiteful instead of being selfish，and more decision-making support methods should be provided to the supplier to improve the quality of the wholesale price decision．