Abstract:This paper takes the fiscal system reform of“Province-Managing-County”as a natural experiment，and，based on national county panel data，constructs the“counterfactual”state by using the PSM-DID method that can effectively correct the selection bias problems，and assesses the average treatment effect of the reform on the county government fiscal capacity．The results show that the reform increases per capita fiscal revenue of the county government，but reduces per capita transfer payment; the decline is relatively large，thus lead to a decrease in per capita total fiscal revenue．Hence，the reform of“Province-Managing-County”not only fails to improve，but to some extent worsens a county’s financial situation．The average treatment effect in the East and Central regions is similar to that of the whole nation，and the above conclusions are robust．In addition，a test on the impact mechanism is conducted．The fiscal competition between a prefecture-level city and a county、between counties，and the coordination mechanism of province to cities and counties all influence the effect of the financial system reform to a certain extent．

Abstract:This paper，in the classical newsvendor framework，investigates the impact of replacing the business tax (BT) with the value-added tax (VTA) on equilibrium financing in a capital-constrained supply chain，where there are one productive servicer and one capital-constrained manufacturer．The manufacturer may borrow credit from a competitive bank market or from the productive servicer．When only one credit type is available under the VAT system，the manufacturer’s optimal order quantity will increase in the case of bank credit and the productive servicer can get more profit in the case of trade credit． When both bank and trade credits are available，the unique equilibrium financing is bank credit (trade credit) if the risk-free interest rate is relatively low and the service cost is relatively high (low) but is always trade credit if the risk-free interest rate is relatively high． Numerical studies show that the supply chain efficiency under the VAT system is higher than that under the BT system．Consequently，replacing BT with VAT is beneficial to the development of productive services sector and improvement of supply chain efficiency，which supports the rationality of this reform in some sense．

Abstract:Previous research basically categorized organizational learning by the content and consequences of learning (horizontal and vertical)．Different from those，from the perspective of the relationship between the learning input (the amount of experiences) and learning output (learning effectiveness)，this paper，for the first time at home and abroad，proposes that organizational learning could be categorized as quantitative-style learning and qualitative-style learning．As learning input increases，quantitative-style learning represents the incremental and gradual changes in learning output，and the relationship is nearly linear．As learning input increases and reaches a certain point，qualitative-style learning will happen，always coming along with radical and sharp changes in the quantity or nature of cognition or behaviors or both，and the relationship is basically non-linear．In order to promote the transfer，two prerequisites: reaching the critical amount of experiences for learning (CAEL) and having a learning trigger condition，should be met，and these are the necessary mechanisms．In order to fasten the transfer，learning actors could change mental models or create an environment with openness，and these are learning catalysts．An actor’s learning activity should be comprised of both quantitative-style learning and qualitative-style learning in manners of dynamical changes and upward developments．

Abstract:As the traditional strategic trade policies are restricted by WTO，green subsidy，as a strategy with environmental policy effect，is adopted by many countries．In a multi-stage duopoly competition model，this paper investigates the mechanism of green subsidy and its spillover effect on government and firm behaviors．The results show that if the government provides unilateral green subsidies to domestic firms in accordance with the EOS and SOS respectively，only the subsidy under SOS can improve domestic social welfare by changing firms’Cournot output and environmental emission standard．However，compared with EOS，the green subsidy under SOS may give the government a stronger incentive for ecological dumping，which makes the domestic environment more likely to deteriorate．In addition，owing to technology spillover，the domestic welfare declines as its emission standard raises and firms profit reduces，while the foreign welfare improves as both their emission standards and firms’profits increase．In a generalized model，it is found that the government’s rational environmental policy is to offer the optimal green subsidies in non-cooperative cases or levy the optimal taxes in cooperative cases．

Abstract:Ｒegarding the climate feedback economic losses caused by GHG emissions，how to guide the directed technological innovation exactly to achieve long-term green growth has become a major challenge．Based on DICE model，a nonlinear optimal control model，which considers the equilibrium，inclusiveness and sustainability of green growth，is established to reconstruct the endogenous relationship between the dynamic factors of directed technological innovation and climate innovation．The numerical simulation shows that: firstly，the climate feedback economic losses should not be underestimated; secondly，under the guidance of green technological innovation stressing production，social production is powerful but there is a risk of environmental degradation; under the guidance of green technological innovation stressing emission reduction，climate feedback economic losses are small but a risk of lack of growth momentum exists．Although，long-term green growth can be achieved by both directions，neutral green technological innovation will be more stable．Finally，the rate of per-capita consumption will be improved significantly in the short term under the first guidance．

Abstract:Different from literatures in supply chain management which focuses on the role of revenue-sharing contract in coordinating supply chains，this paper mainly studies the effect of such contracts on upstream suppliers’pricing decisions，allocation efficiency and social welfareＲesults show that: in supply chains coordinated by a revenue-sharing contract，an upstream supplier imposes discriminatory pricing to downstream heterogeneous manufactures，which，along with downstream efficiency and product substitution，affects the allocation efficiency and social welfare．Though revenue-sharing can increase joint profits through coordination，the effect on consumer surplus and social welfare is ambiguous．This paper also discusses the effect of firms’relative bargaining power on the revenue-sharing proportion，and identifies factors affecting the revenue-sharing parameter．Finally，based on the analyzed results，it is suggested that，as a means of vertical restraint，the anti-trust examination on revenue-sharing should adopt the“rule of reason”rather than“per se illegal”．

Abstract:A supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer is studied．The retailer faces stochastic customer demand and purchases from the supplier via either an option contract or a combined contract of forward and option．Under either scenario，a Stackelberg game is modeled respectively，and the optimal replenishment policy for the retailer and the optimal pricing strategy for the supplier are studied from the perspective of the supplier and the retailer respectively．The comparison results show that the supplier is always better off under the option contract and even under the combined contract，and that the supplier will set the price of the forward contract high enough to prevent the retailer from purchasing via the forward contract．Whether the retailer will be better off under the option contract is affected by the option exercise price and the salvage value of the product．

Abstract:A theoretical framework of the control rights defense mechanism is set up firstly，and then the model is verified with the case of Vanke’s control rights defense to Baoneng．Conclusions indicate the followings: (1) Based on symbiosis hypothesis，the design of control rights defense mechanism in advance (preventive) and in progress (active) are separately determined by Firm-specific and M＆A’s path characteristics．(2) To prevent the control rights defenses protect managers excessively，it is necessary to set a balance mechanism to maintain a symbiotic relationship．(3) The design of control rights defense mechanism is also influenced by the institutional environment，and needs to be improved along with changes of firm-specific characteristics，institutional environment and M＆A’s path characteristics．This paper makes a breakthrough in the existing company control rights defenses frameworks and offers some references to the design of control rights defenses mechanism for China’s listed companies．

Abstract:The report of 19th CPC National Congress claims that it is necessary to improve the financial regulatory system to forestall systemic financial risks．Prior studies on financial regulation mainly focus on ex post penalties．However，preventive regulation plays a key role in forestalling systemic financial risks．For example，The Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange have sent comment letters in time to firms which have potential risks in financial report recently．So，based on the experiment environment of the Exchange’s comment letters，the paper examines whether preventive regulation mitigates stock price crash risk effectively．The results show that exchange comment letters can mitigate stock price crash risk and the effect is more pronounced if a firm’s financial report is more opaque．Therefore，these findings offer a new regulatory viewpoint that the Exchange’s comment letters are beneficial to protect investors’interest and maintain the stability of financial markets．