Abstract:Industrial innovation network is composed of innovation orientated firms and relationships among them. Studying the evolution mechanism of industrial innovation network is of great importance. However,there are few research achievements in this field,especially the quantitative ones. Based on social network theory,the paper describes the industrial innovation network as network of innovation oriented firms,with knowledge network and social network as the basis of network innovation,and the entry and exit of firms together with firms' decision making forming the evolution of industrial innovation network. Multi-agent simulation model based on the above hypotheses is built to analyze the evolution mechanism of industrial innovation networks. The evolution of the third generation mobile communications( 3 G) industry based on TD-SCDMA technical standard in China shows that the simulation model can to some extent reflect the characteristics of the evolution mechanism of industrial innovation networks,and that simulation is an effective method for interpreting the evolution mechanism of industrial innovation networks.

Abstract:This paper studies the airline's strategy of ticket selling on its own website or through other distribution channels,and discusses the optimal pricing strategy when there are Online Travel Agency( OTA) platforms. Travelers are divided into“loyal”and“disloyal”ones; the airline is supposed to maximize its profit by setting optimal ticket prices and rebates,while the OTA would accordingly set the optimal price according to the travelers' demand and the airline's decision. The results reveal that the sensitivity of airline travelers' demand to price is larger than that of the OTA platform's travelers'; The airlines are less likely to join the OTA platform if they have a large loyal consumer base or the OTA platform is more competitive; The airline market will achieve a state of equilibrium when there are a certain number of airlines on the OTA platform. Numerical results are presented for the model validation.

Abstract:Considering that critical mass is determined endogenously by price and other factors,and different from existingliterature which take “critical mass”as the main factor impeding platform development,a two stage pricing strategy is proposed,by introducing complex network method,to improve the profit of two-sided platforms by means of exploiting the characteristics of critical mass. The thetwo-stage optimal pricing strategy examines,with numerical examples,how platform service quality,cross network effects and degree distribution exponent affect the optimal pricing strategy. Results show that the two-stage pricing strategy based on critical mass can improve platform's optimal profit significantly. Both the optimal profit and market share of the two-stage pricing will increase when improving the superiority of platform service quality. Stronger cross network effects or higher degree distribution exponent will improve the relative profit advantage of two-stage pricing than traditional pricing strategy. These results provide some guidelines and implications for platform managers to develop pricing strategies so as to make profits by exploiting the characteristics of critical mass.

Abstract:Enhanced indexation model( EIM) adopts some of the constituents to construct a portfolio to track the benchmark index and obtain excess returns. As the benchmark index falls,the tracking portfolio follows and yield negative returns. Therefore,it is necessary to add downside risk constraints to the traditional EIM in order to prevent the tracking portfolio from jumping in conjunction with severe market recession. It is noticeable that,as a downside risk measure,the lower partial moment( LPM) has good theoretical properties and covers the classical measures such as loss probability,expected loss,and lower semi-variance. In this paper,an EIM with the LPM constraint is constructed. Its key characteristics are threefolds. First,our model has a more general objective function to meet investors' risk preferences. By adjusting the balanced parameter,our model can be degenerated to the traditional index replication model and excess returns maximum model. Second,the nonparametric LPM constraint is added to our model in order to control the downside risk of the tracking portfolio. Third,the objective function and the nonparametric first-order LPM are proven to be a convex function of the portfolio's position,and the EIM with nonparametric first-order LPM are proven to be a convex optimization problem. Finally,Monte Carlo simulation and the empirical results show that our model can effectively control the downside risk and obtain excess returns.

Abstract:Innovation is an important driver of economic growth. The enterprise innovation behavior continues to attract the attention of the government,academia and media. Although studies have shown that innovation improves firms' long term performance,however,in the evaluation of fund performance,there is little paper focus on the relationship between fund preferences for innovation firms and fund performance. In this paper,the mutual fund's portfolio data is employed to investigate whether mutual funds investment preferences for innovative listed firms can improve funds performance and whether different degrees of innovation preferences and the characteristic of mutual funds can influence the performance of funds,which invest in innovative firms. Results show that funds investing more in innovative companies outperform others in long term. Further,a fund's industry preferences,its team manager and portfolio concentration degree are all have positive effects on the performance of funds investing in innovative firms. Our finding provides clear policy implications for the evaluation of innovation firm for investors,fund companies,and regulators.

Abstract:From the perspective of the professional background of venture capitalists,this paper compares the investment performances of two different types of venture capitalists,which are characterized as financial background and business background, respectively. Data of the venture capital projects,individual venture capitalists and invested enterprises show that venture capitalists with financial background are more likely to be successful than that those with business background. Specifically,in terms of the investment performance of the venture capitalists with financial background,the probability of exiting from the investment project by IPO is higher. Meanwhile,this type of venture capitalists,which usually exhibit more radical investment style,always prefer independent,trans-regional and large scale investment. Further analysis indicates that the financial background of the venture capitalists could help invested enterprises to finance more quickly and easily in the next round of VC and to hire better underwriters,which is conductive to obtaining relatively high IPO price and low underpricing rate,in the process of IPO.

Abstract:Ownership concentration and the resulted “insider control”constitute an important basis for the game between insiders and outside investors of listed companies in China. Within the framework of“reciprocal altruism”,this paper investigates whether and how corporate insiders interact with security analysts,by making use of information superiority,and damage the interests of outside investors. Using the data of reducing holding-shares of insiders and the rating data of analysts during the period 2007-2013,the following conclusions are drawn. Firstly,optimistic rating reports are usually intensively issued before insider selling,and the number of optimistic rating reports is positively associated with insider selling value. Secondly,the relation above exists in the insider selling of both non-executive shareholders and executive shareholders,and increases with the influence of the executives. Thirdly,this relation is more likely when the insiders have a stronger motivation to manage the corporate information environment. Fourthly,both the insiders and analysts benefit: the insiders gain excess earnings by selling shares while the analysts gain more private information. Such evidence supports the collusion idea between corporate insiders and security analysts. The findings in this paper comprehensively present the motivation,means and consequences of the reciprocal altruism between insiders and security analysts,promote the understanding of the interactive behaviors between corporate insiders and security analysts in emerging capital markets,and provide certain inspirations for supervisors in the regulation of information disclosure,fight against insider transactions and the maintanence of market order.