Abstract:The paper assumes that naive investors in financial markets are ambiguity averse, and that they will obtain stochastic endowments (non-financial asset profits) at the end of the term and are currently ambiguous about the correlation coefficient between stochastic endowment and the payment of a risky asset. The effects of correlation ambiguity on asset pricing and aggregate social welfare are investigated. Our results demonstrate that correlation ambiguity might lead to limited participation and distortion of asset pricing. If the correlation coefficient is negative, and equity premium is positive, naive investors will obtain positive excess returns. If there is no correlation, or no equity premium, they cannot obtain excess return. And under other conditions they will obtain negative excess return. The regulators might implement policies, such as increasing the registration costs for sophisticated or strengthening disclosure requirements, to mitigate the ambiguity and improve participation. Further studies show that increasing registration costs will reduce the fraction of sophisticated investors and decrease the social welfare; whereas strengthening the disclosure requirements and market transparency can increase the aggregate social welfare.

Abstract:This paper studies the influence of the informal institutional factor of regional intergenerational mob-山ty, on family involvement in firm management.The results show that, the higher level of the regional intergenerational mobility, the less family members of actual controllers are involved in the firm management. The mechanism analysis suggests that, a higher level of intergenerational mob山ty, via strengthening the general trust, weakening the limited trust, and enhancing the fairness perception of the actual controllers, inhibits their demand for family members in the firm management; meanwhile, regions with higher intergenerational mob山ty also have more efficient labor-resource allocation, leading to a higher market supply of manager candi-dates, The above two impacts may combine to lower the involvement of family members in local firms'man-agement. Further analysis shows that, on average, family involvement in the management helps ease the agen-cy cost. Nevertheless, such an effect does not exist in areas with low intergenerational mobility, which indi-rectly suggests the "irrational" choice in enterprises'management team caused by the stagnant intergeneration-al mob山ty. This paper introduces an informal institutional factor, intergenerational mobility, into the analysis of the cause of the family involvement in firm management, and provides evidence from a new perspective for further research in this field.

Abstract:Based on trust repair theory in causal attribution dimension，this paper examines the market reactions to management’s responsibility acceptance using data of listed companies in China which had material internal control weaknesses (ICW)．The results show that management’s responsibility acceptance increased the perceived responsibility and invited investors to blame management for ICW，thus experienced negative market reaction．It is found that management’s responsibility acceptance had more pronounced negative market reaction for firms with more serious ICW and more financial report-related ICW． Furthermore，the rectification of internal control weaknesses and media coverage significantly reduced the negative market reaction of management’s responsibility acceptance．Besides，although management’s responsibility acceptance had negative effects on securities market in the short term，it facilitated information transparency and reduced future stock price crash risk．This paper has important implications for understanding the role of management’s responsibility acceptance，and provides certain theoretical references for deepening the internal control system reform and improving the supervision of relevant department．

Abstract:Equity financing is an important means for growth-type enterprises to capture growth opportunities and implement leap-forward development． However，whether to sign a valuation adjustment mechanism (VAM) in equity financing has long puzzled entrepreneurs． This paper studies VAM from the perspective of value creation and supply-demand matching． Based on the retailer’s risk aversion and ambiguity aversion decision-making behavior，the utility models with and without VAM are constructed，and the effects of VAM on retailer’s policy and utility are compared． The results show that there is a“VAM signing interval”，which helps to improve performance，even in the more conservative risk aversion case． In addition，the level of enterprise growth is the key factor for signing the VAM: entrepreneurs should sign the VAM when their enterprise has high growth opportunities; while if the growth opportunity is insufficient，the valuation and profit margin of the enterprise should be considered to determine whether to sign a VAM．

Abstract:Why do banks provide implicit guarantee to their off-balance wealth management products (WMPs) ，even though they are not required to do so? Ｒelevant domestic literature are qualitative and lack of normative model analysis． Existing foreign literature either cannot explain the phenomena perfectly，such as why the proportion of WMPs invested in non-standard assets is significantly lower than the upper limit of regulation，or ha- ven’t considered ex post information asymmetry with WMPs，thus failing to fully explain the cause of implicit guarantee． We use costly state verification to model information asymmetry on the return of WMPs，use investment method to model information asymmetry on bank’s effort，and construct a delegated portfolio management model to analyze the mechanism of implicit guarantees． The research finds when the cost of circumventing the regulation is lower than a certain amount，it makes a profit for banks to implicitly guarantee their WMPs． Further analysis shows that using signals about return to conclude contracts is helpful to alleviate incentive problems and prevent banks from providing implicit guarantee．

Abstract:Social media technology and social network facilitate the value creation of social commerce． It is a key question for social commerce companies to improve the purchase conversion efficiency by learning how to effectively harness the power of technology and social tie． However，few studies have explored how these two factors influence users’purchase decision． To address this gap，this paper constructs a theoretical research model to explore the social purchase behavior mechanism based on S-O-Ｒ framework by integrating technology affordance as well as strong and weak tie as stimulus factors，diagnosticity and serendipity as organic factors， and social commerce purchase as the response factor． This study collected data from users with social commerce purchase experience on WeChat，and examined the hypothesis by using Smart PLS 3.0.The results found that: technology affordance and weak tie have significantly positive effects on both diagnosticity and serendipity; the effect of weak tie on serendipity is larger than that of strong tie on serendipity; diagnosticity positively influences serendipity; both diagnosticity and serendipity have positive effects on social commerce purchase intention． However，this study also found that: strong tie has no significant effect on serendipity; diagnosticity and serendipity play a partial mediating role on the relationship between technology affordance and purchase intention and play a full mediating effect on the relationship between weak tie and purchase intention; diagnosticity plays a partial mediating role on the relationship between strong tie and purchase intention． This study extends research on social commerce and provides theoretical foundation and practical guidance for researchers and practitioners．

Abstract:Platform managers should consider the effects of two-sided network externalities when make pricing decisions for users on both sides． Besides，investment strategies are also essential to platforms． Focusing on the online video platforms，a game model is developed to investigate the trade-off between the strategies of two-sided pricing and the investment of UGC ( user-generated content) ． Different video contents exhibit different attributes． The UGC attracts advertisers differently compared with the copyright contents，as affects the investment strategy of the platform． The platforms’joint-decision on pricing and UGC investment is studied． Three scenarios are considered: monopoly，duopoly with multi-homing advertisers，and duopoly with single-homing advertisers． Optimal decisions on two-sided pricing and UGC investment for each scenario are given，and are compared with those of traditional markets to explore the differences in terms of the decision-making． The results show how the platforms’investment and pricing strategies are affected by the characteristics of UGC and by the differentiation between competing platforms．